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THE PARTISANSHIP SPECTRUM
JUSTIN LEVITT*
ABSTRACT
In a polarized political environment, allegations of excessive
partisanship by public actors are ubiquitous. Commentators, courts,
and activists levy these allegations daily. But with remarkable
consistency, they do so as if “partisanship” described a single
phenomenon. This Article recognizes that the default mode of
understanding partisanship is a descriptive and diagnostic failure
with meaningful consequences. We mean different things when we
discuss partisanship, but we do not have the vocabulary to under-
stand that we are talking past each other.
Without a robust conceptualization of partisanship, it is difficult
to treat pathologies of partisan governance. Indeed, an undifferenti-
ated approach to partisanship makes it difficult to distinguish the
features from the bugs in our political system.
Moreover, the failure to understand partisanship impairs our
ability to confront the partisanship we care about most. Most
observers attempt to constrain unwanted partisanship through
substantive rules and structural design. But parsing the spectrum of
partisanship shows that these tools are neither necessary nor
sufficient to address partisanship in its most disparaged forms.
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Conversely, analysts have failed to appreciate the power of strong
situational norms to combat the least justifiable partisanship.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, officials seem to refrain from this
form of partisanship far more often than they succumb to it, and
norms may provide the explanation. Because these norms are socially
constructed, the way we talk about partisanship matters. And we are
likely getting the discussion very wrong, undermining exactly what
we would hope to preserve.
This Article attempts to flesh out the distinctions that have been
heretofore elided. It develops a typology of partisanship, and then
engages that conceptual structure to assess the various tools by which
forms of partisanship—including the most pernicious portions of the
partisan structure—may be addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
We are repeatedly told, by scholars1 as well as the popular press,2
that we are living in an age of astonishing political partisanship by
public officials. These descriptive assertions often arrive with
normative critique and prescriptive responses. In response to the
outcry, other scholars vigorously defend partisanship in public
office.3 And the Supreme Court, while generally offering neither
defense nor critique, has also noted the extensive influence of
political partisanship in public policy.4
The vast majority of these observations share a common flaw that
distorts diagnosis, analysis, and (where appropriate) treatment.
Discussions of political partisanship in public office too often
misunderstand the object of their attention as a concept uniform in
1. Consider, from 2012 alone, Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance,
64 FLA. L. REV. 1369, 1379 (2012) (“[In] election law, ... partisanship is not only ubiquitous,
but essentially ineliminable.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1, 66 (2012) (“We live in an era of hyperpolarized, ugly partisanship.”); Nicholas
O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379,
1394-95 (2012) (“In an era riven by partisanship, it is ... hard to quarrel with an approach that
might weaken the grip of political parties.”); Saul Zipkin, Administering Election Law, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 641, 643 (2011-12) (“In recent years, commentators and judges have displayed
heightened concern about political actors making decisions about the electoral process on
partisan or incumbent-protecting bases.”); Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 550, 553 (2012) (book review) (“[F]ixing [Washington’s] broader problems likely will
have to await a societal shift that alleviates the partisanship currently gripping national
politics.”).
2. Consider, from 2012 alone, Evan Bayh, Profiles in Partisanship, CHI. TRIB., May 15,
2012, at 17, available at 2012 WLNR 10222945; Callum Borchers, Jeb Bush Criticizes GOP
Partisanship, BOST. GLOBE, June 12, 2012, at 8, available at 2012 WLNR 12268930; Editorial,
Partisanship at Its Worst, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Dec. 8, 2012, at 16A, available at 2012 WLNR
26267315; Editorial, Rank Partisanship, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 24, 2012, at A6,
available at 2012 WLNR 1653436; Editorial, Supreme Court Tipping Scales of Partisanship,
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, May 29, 2012, http://articles.philly.com/2012-05-30/news/31888660_1_
insurance-mandate-justices-affordable-care-act; Editorial, Toxic Politics: Poisonous
Partisanship Claims More Moderates, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 2012, at B6,
available at 2012 WLNR 17681992.
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. CONNELLY, JR., JAMES MADISON RULES AMERICA: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF CONGRESSIONAL PARTISANSHIP 2-6 (2010); NANCY L. ROSENBLUM,
ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP (2008); Franita
Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395 (2012).
4. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203-04 (2008) (plurality
opinion); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285-86 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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character. The labels “partisan” and “nonpartisan” are ubiquitous
in the discourse but elide meaningful and under-recognized dis-
tinctions in the underlying character of the phenomenon to be
addressed.
The repeated conflation of distinct forms of partisanship is not
merely a semantic problem. Imagine the pragmatic difficulties
confronting geologists with just one word for “rock” or physicians
with just two words for “body stuff.” Or, even more apt, imagine a
descriptively impoverished conception of light. To early civilizations,
light appeared undifferentiated. One could conceive of more light or
less light, but the only variable of interest was magnitude. We now
understand that the light we observe has different components,
some of which are valuable and some of which are harmful, in
different combinations and to different degrees. That enlightened
understanding is not merely of theoretical interest. It helps us
recognize the utility of tools to replicate the aspects we favor and
limit those that we do not, and establishes a foundation for building
those tools. Understanding the spectrum of light creates the
possibility of sunscreen and tanning booths, reflective blankets and
microwave ovens.
So too with partisanship. Understanding the spectrum of
partisanship similarly aids both theorists and practitioners of
modern democracy. Without a robust conceptualization of partisan-
ship, analysts misdiagnose. Reformers aim at mistaken targets.
Observers evaluating reforms critique the innovations for failing to
achieve results that they were not meant to achieve. We fail to
accurately articulate and analyze what we perceive; that impover-
ished descriptive capacity leads directly to impoverished theoretical
and remedial capacity. We do not recognize the problem we are
attempting to solve or how to solve the problem we observe—if,
indeed, what we observe is truly problematic at all. We may well be
focused on solutions to effects that are not problematic, and we may
be unwittingly undermining the central component of our most
successful tool against the partisanship we rightly fear most.
Perhaps public institutions are not nearly as “partisan” as we
think—and perhaps we are unintentionally encouraging them to
become more so.
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Below, I attempt to articulate the distinctions that have been
heretofore elided, rendering a deeper conceptualization of the modes
of official political partisanship than has appeared thus far in the
literature. The development of the spectrum of partisanship may
help scholars theorize public action and its occasional pathologies,
which are of particular consequence in the context of electoral
regulation. It may also lead, down the road, to doctrinal clarifica-
tion. For example, understanding the spectrum of partisanship
provides new insight on the Supreme Court’s unduly unrefined
approach to partisanship in the redistricting arena.5
But this is not primarily a piece about judicial review. Beyond the
judiciary, descriptive precision yields tangible payoff by allowing a
thorough examination of extant policy models to confront partisan-
ship, revealing the degree to which they may be suited to address
some forms of partisanship but not others. In this vein, the prevail-
ing thrust of recent work focuses on effect-based rules6 and struc-
tural design.7 Both are undeniably important. But commentators
seem to have missed that their favored reforms may be neither
necessary nor sufficient to address the most pernicious forms of
partisanship. In particular, I point out that the most disfavored
form of partisanship is—despite the hyperbole—far less prevalent
than should be expected given current rules and structure. That is,
the spectrum of partisanship shows that the world we live in is
actually far less partisan than conventionally believed, when it
comes to the form of partisanship that we care about most. And the
reformers’ most favored tools are not primarily responsible for this
state of affairs.
Instead, I posit that situational norms and role morality are
bearing most of the existing load. These norms are surprisingly
powerful but also surprisingly fragile. Role morality is maintained
by targeted social sanction for violating shared norms: that is,
norms are maintained based on how and when we laud or criticize
the public action we observe. Misdirected approval or critique erodes
the strength of the norm.8 Without a nuanced understanding of
5. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part III.D.
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partisanship, current discourse is often exceedingly poorly targeted,
undermining one of the most effective weapons against undesirable
partisan action. This Article attempts to correct that misstep.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I brings some descriptive
precision to bear on the spectrum of partisanship in public office,
working through an introductory typology. These distinct forms of
partisanship have different normative valences in different contexts:
some partisanship is valued, and some is not. Part II turns briefly
to partisanship in the creation of electoral rules, which exacerbate
the impact of partisan behavior and thereby give rise to concerns of
greater weight. Part III examines the prevailing means to address
different forms of partisanship, noting the strengths and limitations
of each. It then demonstrates that the best recognized tools cannot
explain what we observe in the real world—and discusses situa-
tional norms, the underappreciated tools that can do so.
I. THE SPECTRUM OF PARTISANSHIP
The literature reflecting upon political partisanship in public
office is plentiful. It spans disciplines and methodologies, from the
rigorously empirical to the resolutely philosophical to the emphati-
cally pop.9 Yet most of this work shares a common unrecognized
flaw: an assessment of “partisanship” as if the concept were
uniform.10
In this Article, I treat political partisanship in public office as a
category of activity: a genus rather than a species. It comprises
9. See, e.g., supra notes 1-2.
10. One of the few exceptions is Professor Brian Tamanaha’s valuable recent exposition
on the nature of judicial decision making. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Several Meanings of
“Politics” in Judicial Politics Studies: Why “Ideological Influence” Is Not “Partisanship,” 61
EMORY L.J. 759 (2012). Tamanaha articulates a slightly different vision of “ideology” and
“politics” and “partisanship,” and the proper place of each, than that set forth in this paper.
And even he conflates political partisanship (for example, favoring Democrats or Republicans)
with undue favoritism on behalf of an ideology or cause. E.g., id. at 775 (“Partisanship is ...
[when] judges decide cases with a conscious conservative or liberal agenda driving their legal
analysis.”).
Other work recognizing differences among actions deemed “partisan” tends to succumb to
tautology in explaining these distinctions. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Defining “Partisan” Law
Enforcement, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 324, 340-42 (2007) (defining actions as impermissibly
partisan when they are “illegitimate or largely illegitimate,” but refraining from defining
when actions are “illegitimate”).
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activity reliably favoring or appealing to adherents of one political
party11 over others or injuring adherents of one or more political
parties more than others.12 This may include activity reliably
favoring or injuring individually identified political actors or party
adherents as a class. The preceding participles are both ambiguous
and intentional: “favoring” and “appealing” and “injuring” may refer
to intent, or effect, or both. And this definition is also not exclusive.
That which reliably and systematically favors Republicans over
others, or that which is designed to do so, may be understood as
partisan even if it also favors some Democrats or third party
members to a lesser degree.
As should be clear from this discussion, political partisanship is
distinct from polarization—though the terms are often improperly
conflated. Political partisanship refers to the activity of public
officeholders benefitting or harming adherents of particular political
parties. Polarization refers to the degree to which adherents of
particular political parties—whether public officials or private
individuals—have contrasting or overlapping preferences. This
paper concerns only the former, though the degree of polarization
may well exacerbate some of the effects of political partisanship
discussed below.
A. Different Manifestations of Partisanship
Partisan effect, in the main, is relatively straightforward to
understand. It is a measure of differential policy output: one party’s
supporters gain more than the supporters of a different party.
11. I include both members of the political party in question and those who, without
formally becoming members, consistently vote as if they were members: independents or
third-party members who consistently vote as Republicans or Democrats. See generally BRUCE
E. KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER (1992); see id. at 4 (concluding that
independents “are largely closet Democrats and Republicans”); Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship
and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 35, 36-37 (2000) (finding that though
voters continue to self-identify as independents in greater numbers, the proportion of
independents who do not favor one party is declining); Jon Cohen & Dan Balz, Independents
Are Key. So Who Are They?, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2012, at A1, available at 2012 WLNR
17665707 (“Nearly two-thirds of Americans who describe themselves as independents act very
much like partisan Republicans or partisan Democrats.”).
12. This definition acknowledges the possibility that bipartisan agreement among major
parties and their proponents might well entail partisanship with respect to minor parties.
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Partisan effect may be fleeting or enduring, large or small. And it
may be assessed in various ways—for example, by evaluations of the
relative impact of government action on types of candidates or on
subgroups of voters known to prefer candidates of one party or
another.
Partisan effect, particularly in the extreme, matters. But a study
of partisanship is impoverished if it concerns only the partisan effect
of public actions. Estimations of partisan effect do not reveal why
that effect exists.13 And if we seek to not only measure but influence
partisan effect—to foster, limit, harness, or control it—we must also
be concerned with the inputs to partisan decisions.
Just like partisan effect, partisan motivation is typically con-
ceived as a single appraisable phenomenon. A decision may be
thought of as strongly partisan, weakly partisan, or nonpartisan,
but conventional wisdom conceives of the variation only in degree.
This conventional wisdom, I argue, is wrong. Partisan motivation
is more accurately—and more usefully—represented by a spectrum
than a single categorical box. I describe four distinct forms of
partisan motivation, related but distinct.
1. Coincidental Partisanship
On one end of the spectrum is action that produces partisan im-
pact purely by happenstance. That is, the policies that policymakers
favor for improving the commonweal happen also to favor voters of
the same partisan stripe, but the relationship is pure coincidence.
A public hospital may be placed in a neighborhood that happens to
be marginally closer to Republicans, or notarization requirements
may leave permitting procedures marginally more accessible to
Democrats. Flip a coin, and it sometimes comes up Democratic and
sometimes comes up Republican. This is partisanship observable
13. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1051, 1057 n.23 (2010) (reviewing research on judicial partisanship, including
correlations between the party of the judge or the appointing president and the party favored
by the judicial ruling in an election matter, and noting that these studies do not clarify
whether the effect “has anything to do with the pursuit of partisan advantage or whether it
instead reflects a party-correlated difference in judicial ideology”).
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only in its effect, not in the process of its creation. We may call this
coincidental partisanship.14
2. Ideological Partisanship
Some partisan impact will be “lightly” caused by partisan
considerations. Here, there is more causal linkage than a coin flip.
Officials with a partisan affiliation have chosen a party that reflects
their preferred approach to public policy—or, more likely, the
officials’ experience supporting a party has informed their approach
to policy.15 For example, a legislator who favors a smaller govern-
ment role may join the Republican Party because that party has
built a brand extolling smaller government. Or a legislator with a
long history of support for the Republican Party may come to
support smaller government based on the party’s ideological
commitments. Either way, the official’s favored policies will reflect
the broad preferences of party members more closely than they
reflect the broad preferences of members of competing parties.16 The
relationship is neither coincidental nor drawn directly from
consideration of the wishes of fellow partisans. It is instead driven
14. This notion echoes Robert Dixon’s idea of “innocent partisanship.” See ROBERT G.
DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 534
(1968).
15. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter
Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 374-76; Alan S.
Gerber et al., Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment, 104
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 720, 720-21 (2010).
16. I understand that individuals may sometimes prefer policies that appear to work to
their immediate disfavor. See, e.g., HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 162-65, 204-05 (1967). This appearance may be illusory. That is, a policy
may appear to work to an individual’s disfavor when it actually increases her welfare ... as
long as the assessment of “welfare” includes, as it must, not only objective external
determinants of well-being but also the individual’s subjective preferences and tastes. See
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 980, 982,
1334, 1350-54 (2001).
For purposes of this Article, when there is an apparent conflict between an individual’s
expressed preference and an external assessment of her welfare, ideological partisanship
follows expressed preferences as the relevant measure. If Democrats (but not Republicans)
in a jurisdiction reliably prefer strict limits on campaign finance contributions, but would
reliably be able to elect more Democratic candidates in that jurisdiction without strict limits,
a policy implementing strict limits on campaign finance contributions would reflect ideological
partisanship favoring that jurisdiction’s Democrats.
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by the official’s desire to effectuate her own policy preferences, some
of which also reflect salient partisan cleavages. We may call this
ideological partisanship.
3. Responsive Partisanship
Much partisan impact will be more “heavily” caused by partisan
considerations. In a world that recognizes value pluralism, policies
will have competing legitimate claims to represent the substantive
common good. Policymakers may choose some of these proposals
over others (or choose to prioritize implementation of some over
others) primarily because voters with a shared partisan affiliation
prefer the policies in question to their alternatives. That is, a
Republican legislator who is personally agnostic about the virtues
of smaller government, but who understands smaller government
to be a plausibly superior policy goal, may prefer smaller-govern-
ment policies over other plausible contenders because Republican
voters appear to prefer smaller-government policies. And a Demo-
cratic executive who is charged with enforcing all existing law but
strapped by finite resources may devote comparatively more energy
to enforcing or implementing laws preferred by Democratic voters
than to enforcing or implementing those that are not. In contrast to
the forms of partisanship above, this is conscious, volitional
partisanship: choosing to act in a certain way consistent with a
conception of the public good, but based primarily on the understood
partisan preferences of an external population whom the official in
question desires to please.17 We may call this responsive partisan-
ship.18
Responsive partisanship may be responsive to one or more of
several different constituencies. A Democratic legislator, for
example, may choose among several policies plausibly in the public
17. For any given representative, these will normally be policy preferences reflecting a
plurality of the relevant jurisdiction—but need not be exclusively so. A Democratic official
representing a jurisdiction that normally favors Republicans may decide to act on a policy
with a plausible claim to the common good because the Democrats of the jurisdiction favor
that policy. In so doing, she would be acting on responsive partisanship.
18. As with ideological partisanship, when there is an apparent conflict between a voter’s
expressed preference and an external assessment of her welfare, responsive partisanship
follows expressed preferences as the relevant measure. See supra note 16. 
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interest by responding to the perceived wishes of Democratic voters
in her district, or Democratic voters in her state, or Democratic
voters countrywide (or a subset thereof). Or she may opt for the
policy choices of Democratic party leadership, serving as proxies for
these constituencies, in selecting among policies plausibly in the
public interest.19 Each would represent a form of responsive
partisanship.20
4. Tribal Partisanship
And some of the partisan impact observed in the world will be
“venally” caused by partisan considerations.21 Here, policymakers
may favor public action purely because the policy in question is
perceived to benefit those with a shared partisan affiliation, or
because the policy in question is perceived to injure partisan
opponents, wholly divorced from—or stronger yet, contrary to—the
policymaker’s conception of the policy’s other merits. For example,
a Republican official who believes that smaller government is in the
immediate public interest may prefer to direct increased govern-
ment spending to those perceived to be fellow Republicans or to
exact increased taxation from those perceived to be “enemy”
Democrats, solely because of their partisan affiliation. The exclusive
focus is the intent to aid one’s own team or injure the other side. We
may call this tribal partisanship.22
19. Cf. Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2179-80
(1990) (listing various constituencies to whom representatives may respond).
20. The key to responsive partisanship is that the public actor, while responding to the
wishes of an aligned partisan constituency, independently considers whether the policy choice
in question is plausibly in the public interest. Blindly following the perceived wishes of a
partisan constituency without even cursory regard to the substantive merits is an example
of tribal partisanship, explained in further detail below.
21. These are, to be sure, not the only motivations for public action. I focus here on
motives that reflect only what might be understood as partisan considerations.
22. If officials undertake action plausibly supported by their conception (or conceptions)
of the common good, it may represent coincidental, ideological, or responsive
partisanship—but, by definition, it will not exemplify tribal partisanship. Tribal partisan-
ship is necessarily divorced from or contrary to the substantive merit of a given public act: it
is concerned only with achieving partisan effect. This distinction between tribal partisanship
and other forms of partisanship echoes Professor Kathryn Watts’s distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate political influences in administrative agency decision making,
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There are more or less specific versions of this tribal partisanship.
Officials may seek to benefit—or injure—broad classes of partisan
constituents, affiliated policy-making colleagues, or particular
named individuals. A Democratic prosecutor who declined to
prosecute a Democrat or chose to prosecute a Republican, because
of that individual’s partisan affiliation, would be engaging in tribal
partisanship.23
I wish to distinguish the spectrum described above, which is
designed to be helpful in understanding the motivation for public
action, from one common use of the term “partisan” in evaluating
public officials: the term used purely as a description of personal
affiliation. Commentators may speak of Republican legislators,
Democratic judges, or Independent administrators, and mean many
different things by the adjective. For example, a judge may be
labeled as “Democratic” because she prefers (or once preferred) to
vote for Democratic candidates, or because she is (or was) registered
as a Democrat, or because she won judicial (or prior) office running
as a Democrat in an election, or because she was appointed to the
bench by a Democratic official. All of these features may (or may
not) be correlated with a judge’s ruling in a particular case,24 but
they shed little incremental light on how or why the affiliation may
impact the result, or whether we should be concerned by the
connection.
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119
YALE L.J. 2, 9, 53-57 (2009), or Professor Sandy Levinson’s distinction between “low” politics
and “high” politics in judicial decision making, Sanford Levinson, Return of Legal Realism,
NATION, Jan. 8, 2001, at 8, available at 2001 WLNR 12077334. Tribal partisanship also seems
to be one form—indeed, perhaps the principal disfavored form—of “naked preference”
described by Professor Cass Sunstein. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1984).
23. It is possible that officials will not always be aware of the reasons for their action.
Much as actions may be undertaken solely because of race due to unconscious bias, see
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 952-58 (2006); cf. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily
and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 992 (2004) (finding substantial racial discrimination,
perhaps unconscious, in the employment market), it is possible that actions may be
undertaken solely because of tribal partisanship due to unconscious bias.
24. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006) (empirically
exploring the ways in which the party affiliation of the President appointing a federal judge
may be correlated with his appointee’s judicial decisions).
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Put differently: officials with a personal partisan affiliation, or
who are chosen in a partisan election or by someone chosen in a
partisan election, may or may not act in ways reflecting different
forms of partisanship, which may themselves be desirable or
undesirable. And officials without a personal partisan affiliation, or
who are chosen in a manner divorced from a partisan election
process, may act in ways reflecting a form of partisanship, which
(again) may be desirable or undesirable. If we aspire to useful
analysis and potential modification of public activity, “partisan” as
a description of personal affiliation—rather than the outcome of or
motivation for public action—is not up to the task.
In scholarship no less than popular commentary, the different
forms of partisanship above are repeatedly and carelessly conflated.
This, in turn, leaves commentators talking entirely past each other.
Bush v. Gore provides an infamous example.25 At the time of the
Supreme Court’s decision on December 12, 2000, the existing ballot
count in the presidential election favored Republican candidate
George W. Bush over Democratic candidate Al Gore in the elector-
ally decisive state of Florida, by the most slender of margins.26 The
Court’s five-to-four decision, with the more conservative Justices in
the majority and the more liberal Justices dissenting, stopped a
recount sought by Gore and set in motion by a Florida Supreme
Court27 appointed entirely by Democratic governors.28 The decision
effectively ensured that Bush would become President. Bush v. Gore
was a decision with unquestioned partisan effects, and every
consequential actor involved had a readily observable link to a
political party.29 But describing it as a “partisan” decision is just as
25. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
26. For a discussion of the changes in Bush’s margin of victory preceding the Court’s
decision in Bush v. Gore, see Martin H. Belsky, Bush v. Gore—A Critique of Critiques, 37
TULSA L. REV. 45, 48 & n.29 (2001).
27. Bush, 531 U.S. at 102-03, 111.
28. Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Florida’s State Government, Court Is a Democratic Enclave,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at A27, available at 2000 WLNR 3265455.
29. Some of the “readily observable” links may be less straightforward than they appear.
For example, it is common to refer to the partisan affiliation of a judge by referring to the
partisan affiliation of the nominating President. But of the nine Justices who decided Bush
v. Gore, none were selected through channels of unilateral partisan control. All five of the
Justices in the majority were nominated by Republican Presidents—but Democratic Senates
confirmed Justices Kennedy and Thomas, and though Republican Senates confirmed Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice O’Connor, none of those confirming Senates had
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inadequate an assessment as describing it as a case about elections
or as a case decided in December. The lack of further descriptive
rigor obscures meaningful discussion about the merits of the
decision and the decision-making process.30 Some believe that the
partisanship was coincidental,31 some ideological,32 and some
tribal.33 The differences matter to our understanding of the doctrine,
its normative underpinnings, and its precedential value—and
hence, our understanding of the law going forward.
B. Normative Distinctions Along the Spectrum
By articulating the various distinct phenomena often conflated in
a uniform conception of partisanship, I do not mean to suggest that all
are bad, much less equally bad. In popular parlance, “partisanship”
often suggests a strongly negative connotation. But recognizing
a Republican majority voting bloc sufficient for cloture. Two of the dissenting Justices,
Justices Stevens and Souter, were nominated by Republican Presidents but confirmed by
Democratic Senates (Democrats controlled sixty-one seats for Justice Stevens’ confirmation,
nine months after cloture had been reduced to a sixty-vote threshold). The other two
dissenting Justices, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, were nominated by Democratic Presidents,
and though they were both confirmed by Democratic Senates, neither had a Democratic
majority voting bloc sufficient for cloture. See RICHARD S. BETH & VALERIE HEITSHUSEN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30360, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 8-9 (2013); Party
Divisions in the Senate, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (listing the composition of the
Senate by party); Supreme Court Nominations, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.
gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (displaying
the nomination and confirmation dates of all Supreme Court Justices).
30. Cf. Flanders, supra note 1, at 1371 (“It became hard to separate the criticism that the
decision was wrong from the criticism that the decision was partisan....”).
31. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1219 (2002); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Court’s Decision Is Law, Not Politics, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
14, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 8338898.
32. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Realism About Judges, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 583-84
(2011).
33. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000, at 4 (2001); Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and
Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408-09, 1442-43 (2001) (distinguishing “between the ‘high’
politics of political principle and the ‘low’ politics of partisan advantage,” and speculating that
the Court was guided by the latter); Law Professors for the Rule of Law, 554 Law Professors
Say: By Stopping the Vote Count in Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court Used Its Power to Act as
Political Partisans, Not Judges of a Court of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7
(advertisement). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5-7 (2002) (articulating, and perhaps rejecting, this view).
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partisanship as a set of distinct phenomena helps explain why
partisanship is encouraged, tolerated, or denigrated to different
degrees in different contexts. There is a distinct, often disputed,
normative valence that attaches to different manifestations of
partisanship, often depending on the scenarios in which they arise.34
As discussed in more detail below, coincidental partisanship is
largely tolerated, in part because it is inevitable.35 Partisan effects
are natural consequences of public policy. If it is possible to
conceive, in theory, of a policy that affects those who favor Demo-
crats to exactly the same degree as those who favor Republicans,
Greens, Conservatives, and Libertarians, surely such instances
must be vanishingly rare in the real world. Though it may rarely be
sought, coincidental partisanship therefore seems to be actively
disfavored only when the magnitude of the partisan effects are
excessive.36
Ideological partisanship is, in contrast, an affirmative goal of
most partisan elected positions, and therefore beneficial in those
positions, when present to a moderate degree. Partisan elections
exist, inter alia, in order to help voters roughly assess comparative
distinctions in policy and ideological preferences.37 If there were
truly no ideological distinctions among Democratic, Republican, and
third-party candidates—or if those distinctions were not correlated
with the preferences of voters generally preferring those par-
ties—there would be little utility in choosing officials via a partisan
election.38
Similarly, though less firmly, ideological partisanship is baked
into the design of public positions appointed by officials who are
34. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Courts,
Corporate Law, and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 86, 89 (2013).
35. See infra Part III.A.
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See Ethan J. Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular
Democracy and Popular Democrats Need Parties, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 69, 83-87 (2012). Of
course, in any given election, the partisan cue may be more or less useful in this respect. 
38. Charles Krauthammer, Partisanship Isn’t Divisive, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.),
Oct. 30, 2010, at B7, available at 2012 WLNR 21721057; see also Elmendorf & Schleicher,
supra note 15, at 393-408 (noting accountability difficulties when the policy-related differences
between local candidates do not track party affiliation).
Crucially, I do not claim that ideologically partisan actions by officials selected in partisan
fashion are inherently correct or proper. I claim only that if they are wrong, they are wrong
for reasons other than the simple fact of ideological correlation with party.
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chosen through partisan election. Among equally qualified candi-
dates for an appointed position, there must be some basis for
choosing some and not others. It should not be surprising that, in
the aggregate, a Justice (or cabinet Secretary, or General) appointed
by a Democratic President will have a baseline judicial (administra-
tive, military) orientation more aligned with the preferences of
Democratic voters than a Justice appointed by a Republican
President.39
Responsive partisanship has a more mixed normative pedigree.
In some positions—like the appointed judiciary—direct responsive-
ness to a partisan electorate is roundly disapproved. There are
ongoing discussions, certainly, about the degree to which institu-
tions like the Supreme Court are, or should be, responsive to the
American public generally,40 but the notion that the Justices would
tailor legal doctrine specifically to the preferences of an affiliated
partisan public is wholly foreign. We do not believe that Justices
appointed by Republicans should decide legal cases, or even that
they should exercise docket control by deciding which legal cases to
hear, by assessing what Republican voters prefer.
With respect to other public positions—like elected legisla-
tors—opinions are split. Some believe that direct responsiveness to
a partisan electorate is the primary beneficial engine of social policy,
and that when resource-constrained officials select among plausible
39. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 159
(2012). As the Court explained in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White:
“Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle years, it
would be unusual if they had not by that time formulated at least some tentative
notions that would influence them in their interpretation of the sweeping
clauses of the Constitution and their interaction with one another. It would be
not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they had not at least given opinions
as to constitutional issues in their previous legal careers.” Indeed, even if it were
possible to select judges who did not have preconceived views on legal issues, it
would hardly be desirable to do so. “Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he
joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional
adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”
536 U.S. 765, 777-78 (2002) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum
opinion)).
40. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2596 (2003); Lain, supra note 39, at 157-67; Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least
Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public
Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1033 (2004); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a
“Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 104-05.
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options in the public interest, they ought to select the generalized
policy most likely to gain the approval of aligned partisan voters.41
As a corollary, this necessarily entails less responsiveness to
constituents with opposing partisan preferences. Others favor a
more detached trusteeship model of representation, with officials
owing more than mere responsiveness to the affiliated portion of
the represented population.42 The debate is both longstanding and
unresolved.43
Finally, tribal partisanship is generally denigrated, even with
respect to officials who might be expected to engage in responsive
partisanship. This general assertion depends somewhat on the
perceived role of the official. Consider legislators elected in partisan
contests. Tribal partisanship seems to be widely tolerated in the
legislator’s role as an employer: despite a broader shift from
patronage to performance standards in the executive,44 legislative
41. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111, 122-23 (discussing, without adopting, the “purely populist variant of
procedural democracy”); cf. PITKIN, supra note 16, at 222, 227 (recognizing the notion of
representation as fealty to partisan constituencies); Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After
Citizens United, BOS. REV., Sept. 4, 2010, http://www.bostonreview.net/lessig-democracy-
after-citizens-united (“[F]avoring the policies that one’s constituents favor is the essence of
representative democracy (on at least one dominant conception of it).”).
42. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 318 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in 2 THE WORKS OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 89, 95-97 (John C. Nimmo ed., 1887); Memorandum from
Clark Clifford to Harry S. Truman 29 (Nov. 19, 1947), available at http://trumanlibrary.org/
whistlestop/study_collections/1948campaign/large/docs/documents/pdfs/1-1.pdf (“The people
are inconsistent and capricious but there is no argument that they feel deeply on this —: [The
President] must be President of all the people and not merely the leader of a party....”); Jay
Carney, White House Press Sec’y, Press Briefing (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:33 AM), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/18/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-
carney-9182012 (“When you’re President of the United States you are President of all the
people, not just the people who voted for you.”); see also 1994 CONST. art. 42 (Belg.) (“The
members of the two Houses represent the Nation, and not only those who elected them.”); cf.
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 213, 218-19 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896)
(warning against the “baneful effects of the spirit of party generally”).
43. Even within the trusteeship model, there remain thorny questions about the
geographic scope of the constituency to which a representative owes fealty. See Ethan J. Leib
et al., Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 94-96 (2013).
This Article makes no attempt to “resolve” this debate; indeed, it is not clear that resolution
is possible.
44. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (finding unconstitutional the firing of
executive employees based on their partisan preference, unless “party affiliation is an
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hiring has to some extent gone in the other direction.45 It is now
unremarkable for a legislator to hire members of her own party as
staff, simply because the applicants belong to the same party.46
Truly tribal partisanship is less well received in the representative’s
role as a legislator. General legislation is supposed to bear at least
some passing connection to the public interest.47 A tax break issued
to all registered Republicans, solely because they are registered
Republicans, seems not only legislatively unlikely but normatively
beyond the pale. And tribal partisanship seems less tolerable still
in the representative’s role performing constituent service as an
ombudsman. Even those who champion the right of Democratic
legislators to legislate with the intent to favor Democrats and
disfavor Republicans, regardless of plausible public interest, would
likely balk at a Democratic representative refusing to respond to a
request for administrative assistance by a Republican constituent.48
It is a bit challenging to articulate precisely why tribal partisan-
ship should be denigrated in official action by persons known to
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved”).
45. See George K. Yin, Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2287, 2290-92 (2013) (describing congressional committee staff hiring practices over
time).
46. It is possible, of course, that such hires do not represent tribal partisanship, but
instead represent a legislator’s desire for staff who share ideological commitments and will
therefore work toward policy goals that the legislator prefers. In this context, party
membership may be a heuristic for personal loyalty and ideological fit that helps to reduce
principal-agent friction between a legislator and her staff. It is also possible that the
motivation for the hires is tribal partisanship, plain and simple: providing a benefit to those
with the same partisan affiliation solely because of “team” membership. 
47. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 42, at 47 (James Madison).
48. The assessment of normative valence is not an assertion that legislators actually
forego tribal partisanship in constituent service. See, e.g., Daniel M. Butler & David E.
Broockman, Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field Experiment
on State Legislators, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 463, 469, 472 (2011) (finding, in an experiment based
on legislators’ responses to constituents’ email requests for help registering to vote, that
“[l]egislators are more responsive to requests from individuals of their own party,” albeit
without testing whether legislators consciously sought to respond to co-partisans differently).
That said, even if representatives do respond differently to co-partisans, they rarely justify
such behavior as legitimate. See, e.g., Paul Demko, Minnesota Senate Panel Dismisses
Newman Ethics Complaint, ST. PAUL LEGAL LEDGER, Feb. 10, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR
27971055 (describing an email from a state Senator’s office declaring that the Senator “will
not see any organizations that donated to/supported his opponent,” and noting that the
Senator disclaimed responsibility for sending the email and claimed that it did not actually
reflect his policy).
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have partisan loyalties and recognized—indeed, expected—to act in
their own self-interest. The best answer may be that, unique among
the forms of partisanship, tribal partisanship is the attempt by
public officials to favor or disfavor particular colleagues, competi-
tors, or constituents not because of any plausible conception of
immediate public welfare, but because of the political beliefs that
those individuals express. Such acts offend the basic principle of
freedom of conscience and the basic tenets of civic republicanism.49
But they also violate the principles inherent in equal protection that
government should treat individuals differently only when a legally
relevant distinction forms the basis for such different treat-
ment50—and differences in beliefs and the lawful expression of those
beliefs, protected by the First Amendment, do not amount to
distinctions that individuals acting in the public trust may properly
treat differently.51
There are, to be sure, defenses of tribal partisanship with some
surface appeal. Cynics may defend tribally partisan action as a
response to perceived tribal partisanship by opponents: a useful
weapon in a tit-for-tat exchange. And if the frame is expanded
sufficiently, immediate acts of tribal partisanship aimed purely at
benefitting one’s own supporters (or one’s own lot), or at weakening
the voter base or candidacy of a partisan opponent, may be seen as
effective means to better achieve the legitimate policy goals of like-
minded constituents down the road.52 But this sort of gross utilitarian
49. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1690-92. A related strain of political philosophy holds
that without resort to brute force, political majorities are able to inspire the allegiance of
political minorities only to the extent that the minorities perceive themselves to belong to
the same political community. See, e.g., ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 51. Tribal part-
isanship—acts taken without regard to a plausible notion of the good of the shared
community, and based solely on “in-group” and “out-group” team identity—will tend to erode
that shared community, thereby eroding the consent of political minorities to submit to
majority dominance without brute force. 
50. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
51. See Brass v. State, 291 P.3d 145, 150 (Nev. 2012) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (concluding
that political affiliation is not a legitimate reason to challenge a juror).
52. This may be, for example, the most charitable light in which to construe Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s 2010 statement articulating a vision for his Republican
party colleagues: “The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama
to be a one-term president.” Major Garrett, After the Wave: Mitch McConnell Wants to Learn
from History, but His New Recruits Will Not Be Easily Lead, NAT’L J., Oct. 23, 2010, at 60, 61;
see also Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 484
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calculus amounts to a scorched-earth politics wherein contested
long-term ends justify means that all actors understand to be either
irrelevant or contrary to more immediate public interest. The logic
also tends to foster a dangerous collapse in which legitimate long-
term ends vanish entirely. The premise that it is acceptable for
public actors to pursue intermediate ends purely beneficial to one’s
own party, because one’s party supports policies that benefit
constituents, leads quickly to the notion that it is acceptable to
pursue pure benefit to one’s own party as an end in itself. There is
good reason to disfavor such an approach as the default mode of
executing the responsibilities of public office.
The distinct normative valences of points along the partisanship
spectrum makes clear that motive matters in evaluating an
accusation of “partisanship.”53 Consider a policy pursued with no
reference to party that just happens to burden Republicans more
than Democrats. Such a policy will (and should) be evaluated
differently from one with the same impact but pursued because of
an ideological commitment correlated with Democratic preferences,
or because of a conscious attempt to choose from among plausible
public goods by responding to Democratic voters or their proxies, or
because of a conscious attempt to aid Democrats and hurt Republi-
cans no matter what the other benefits or detriments of the policy
in question. Little wonder that officials object to assertions that they
have engaged in partisanship,54 as if all such activity were equally
subject to scorn.
There are undoubtedly points along the spectrum, as one mode of
partisanship phases into another, where difficult definitional lines
(2012) (“It is unprecedented for a party to consistently reject its own ideas in the hopes of
preventing another party’s President from advancing his legislative agenda. But such
behavior is not petty partisanship: it is grand partisanship.”). McConnell’s statement
necessarily implies that actions to undermine President Obama would take priority over
policies to improve the welfare of Republican voters in the short term; otherwise, making
Obama a one-term president would not be the “single most important thing” to achieve.
53. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked.”).
54. Cf. Adam Liptak, ‘Politicians in Robes’? Not Exactly, but ..., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012,
at A17, available at 2012 WLNR 25180165 (noting that “[m]any [federal] judges hate it when
news reports note” the partisan affiliation of the President who nominated them).
1808 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1787
in tricky contexts raise difficult normative questions.55 But the
existence of fuzzy boundaries on the spectrum of partisanship, and
contested normative approaches to particular tricky circumstances,
does not mean that assessing the normative valence of the partisan-
ship of every act will be fuzzy or tricky.
Return to Bush v. Gore. If coincidental partisanship—the price of
most any action—best explains the partisan effect of the decision,
then whatever the concern with the doctrinal merits of the case, it
seems out of place to highlight judicial partisanship as the proper
subject for attack. Similarly, if the Justices were motivated by
ideological considerations generally affiliated with one party or
another,56 we might reflect on the normative desirability of allowing
elected partisan political actors to nominate and confirm Justices
more generally. But normative critique likely would not then focus
on undue partisanship as the driving force behind this decision as
distinct from others.57 If, instead, the Justices in the majority were
55. Indeed, in any particular situation, it may be immensely difficult for external
observers to discern which of several forms of partisanship is operating, or whether certain
forms of partisanship are operating in tandem. These questions may be particularly difficult
for courts to parse given the evidentiary tools available. In this Article, I delineate the
spectrum, but I do not attempt to operationalize it in the context of judicial review.
56. It would be easy—and unfortunate—to reduce these considerations to one-note
caricatures. Some commentators noted that the five Justices in the majority, nominated by
Republican Presidents, overrode the Florida Supreme Court; they further noted that the
protection of state sovereignty is often associated with the Republican party. Juxtaposing the
two facts, these commentators concluded that the Court could not have been acting with
ideological consistency. See Levinson, supra note 22 (articulating this view). But the Court’s
reversal of a state actor was not the only relevant explanatory factor in the case. For example,
the state judiciary had allegedly departed from the instructions of the state legislature in a
manner establishing a purported conflict with federal constitutional text, and it had done so
in order to give dispositive federal weight to an ad hoc and chaotic recount process uncertain
to yield a more accurate result than the status quo. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000)
(per curiam); id. at 113-14, 116-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The extent to which any of
these factors actually motivated the Court, and the extent to which any of these factors are
aligned with more traditional Republican concerns, is not clear.
My intent above is neither to defend nor to critique the Court’s decision or the process
producing that decision. Instead, I mean to question a supposition of ideological inconsistency
premised upon only one factor in the case and suggest that a more robust assessment is
necessary to support or refute a plausible assertion of ideological partisanship.
57. In order to justify critique of Bush v. Gore as an illegitimate example of ideological
partisanship (if, indeed, the decision was actually motivated by ideological partisanship), it
is necessary to articulate why Justices chosen by officials selected in partisan elections should
be expected to be free from ideological partisanship in cases like Bush v. Gore but not in other
decisions.
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motivated by the opportunity to benefit particular Republican
voters, or simply to punish a Democratic enemy and reward a
Republican friend, the cries of partisanship would be backed by
more legitimately righteous anger, and attention would rightly fo-
cus on preventing a recurrence of similar forms of partisanship in
other cases. Analytical rigor helps parse what kind of partisanship
is operating—and, thus, whether “partisanship” is actually the
problem.
C. A Second Normative Axis
The discussion above attempts to review the normative valence
of certain forms of partisanship. Coincidental partisanship is
generally tolerated; ideological partisanship—at least in positions
elected in partisan contests or appointed by those elected in
partisan contests—should always be expected and is often preferred;
responsive partisanship is disfavored in some public offices and
vigorously contested in others; and tribal partisanship is generally
denigrated.
But this rough breakdown should not imply that all partisanship
within a generally beneficial category is benign.58 Motive matters,
but magnitude matters as well. In the electromagnetic spectrum,
visible light can illuminate but also blind. So too with partisanship. 
As an example, consider ideological partisanship. A moderate
degree of ideological partisanship, particularly by officials elected
through partisan contests, can help an electorate make coherent
decisions about which candidates they prefer to others. When
officials conceive of the public weal in ways roughly correlated with
partisan preferences, that ideological partisanship gives voters a
ready heuristic at the ballot box.59 But too much devotion to ideology
can be dysfunctional. Ideological commitments become inflexible
dogmatic mandates at the extremes, crowding out logical and moral
reasoning, and even (perhaps especially) assessment of fact,60 let
58. And, of course, actions based on beneficial or normatively neutral forms of
partisanship may be detrimental for reasons having nothing to do with the partisan impetus
for the action. Beneficial forms of partisanship do not provide absolution for other substantive
or procedural harms.
59. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 15.
60. See generally Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political
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alone the capacity to understand and appreciate the merits of
contrary views. This is no less true when officials’ sincerely held
ideological commitments mirror (or are created by) partisan divi-
sions as when they are not. To the extent that we prefer public
action to be premised on productive deliberation, empirical fact, em-
pathy, and logic, extremes of ideological partisanship are to be
avoided.61
The point is that there are two axes of normative valence:
category and magnitude. Some forms of partisanship—like ideologi-
cal partisanship—may be beneficial in some roles, but they are
beneficial only in moderation and undesirable in the extreme. Some
forms of partisanship—like tribal partisanship—are undesirable no
matter how modest or intense their manifestation. Either an
undesirable form of partisanship or an undesirable extent of
partisanship may be sufficient for condemnation on its own.
II. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF PARTISANSHIP IN ELECTORAL RULES
The discussion above pertains to partisanship in any substantive
policy area. But one particular policy arena provokes partisanship
concerns of qualitatively distinct salience: the regulation of the
political process. Policies governing the rules of democratic partic-
ipation—the infrastructure of democracy—amplify both the motiva-
tions for and the effects of partisanship.
In other substantive arenas, policymakers are tangibly affected
by their policy decisions, but they are affected largely as other
similarly situated citizens are affected.62 Officials, for example,
generally have to suffer the same income tax increases as every
other citizen in their income bracket. On occasion, individual policy
Perceptions, 24 POL. BEHAV. 117, 133-38 (2002) (discussing motivated cognition in the context
of partisan affiliation); Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 7-8, 19-24 (2011) (discussing motivated cognition more generally); Ross Douthat, Op-
Ed, The Partisan Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A25, available at 2010 WLNR 23689122
(same).
61. See, e.g., Yasmin Dawood, Democracy and the Problem of the Partisan State, in
NOMOS LIV: LOYALTY 257, 266 (Sanford Levinson et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the problems
of partisan extremism).
62. See PITKIN, supra note 16, at 201 (“[E]ach representative has to live as a subject under
the laws he has made.”).
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decisions may become sufficiently salient to cost the official his or
her job. But such moments of political accountability for particular-
ized policy decisions are vanishingly rare.63 Outside of electoral
regulation, it is unusual for policymakers to bear the primary or
exclusive impact, beneficial or otherwise, of the policy in question.64
This is not so for the rules of the election process. These
regulations—redistricting, (more indirectly) election administration
procedures, and (more indirectly still) campaign finance pol-
icy—have greater impact on elected officials than on most other
constituents. The rules of the election process can meaningfully
affect an elected official’s ability to stay in office and her ability to
become, or remain, a member of a controlling faction with increasing
clout. For policymakers, the stakes for these rules are deep and
personal to an extent qualitatively distinct from policy decisions in
other areas.65
As a result, elected officials are more likely to feel keen pressure
to promote their own immediate interests and those of their friends,
and to target perceived enemies, by modifying these regulations or
applying them for immediate tribal partisan gain.66 Appointed
officials are likely to feel similar pressures to help those elected
political colleagues who appointed them to past office or are likely
to appoint them to future office, and to curry favor with those
colleagues by hampering their opponents.
63. Some see the significant Republican victories in the 2010 midterm elections as such
a moment. Under this view, the voters exacted political retribution for Democratic support
for the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Robert E. Moffit, Expanding Choice Through Defined
Contributions: Overcoming a Non-Participatory Health Care Economy, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
558, 558 (2012) (“Since its enactment, popular opposition to the Affordable Care Act has
hardened, and was a significant factor in the 2010 congressional election....”). The extent to
which any given piece of legislation is the cause of a political backlash is exceedingly difficult
to assess with any empirical rigor.
64. Regulation of institutional perquisites like legislator health care may be among the
unusual exceptions.
65. See Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
513, 520-21 (2011); Dennis F. Thompson, Election Time: Normative Implications of Temporal
Properties of the Electoral Process in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 51, 54 (2004)
(noting Madison’s sharp distinction between ordinary legislation and electoral regulation, and
highlighting his observation that representatives “have a personal interest distinct from that
of their constituents” in the latter). 
66. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 520-22; Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein:
Conflicts of Interest in Election Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421, 422, 431-32 (2010).
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Moreover, not only is tribal partisanship more enticing in this
realm, but it exacts a special harm. Although coincidental partisan-
ship, ideological partisanship, and responsive partisanship can all
yield partisan effects, tribal partisanship is more likely to do
so—and in more extreme fashion—because partisan impact is its
sole objective. Benefit to fellow adherents and/or injury to others is
the whole point.
And partisan effects in the electoral realm are particularly
pernicious. Vigorous partisanship in tax policy may not be subject
to the pluralist diffusion contemplated by the Framers in an era
without a national partisan duopoly,67 but it will at least be subject
to cyclical rotation. That which is given in some years may be taken
away in a subsequent political cycle or political age, as control shifts
among the parties. The prospect for eventual retribution may dull
the tribal partisan instinct in most substantive areas, serving as
something of a deterrent as partisanship approaches an extreme.
Tax structures designed solely to favor Republicans and disfavor
Democrats, for example, may provoke responsive tax structures
designed solely to disfavor Republicans and favor Democrats—and
that possibility should deter the opening tribally partisan salvo.68
But as scholars have long recognized, partisanship in the rules of
democratic participation69 can make it systematically more difficult
for out-parties to reclaim control.70 That is, a sufficiently large
67. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 42, at 51-52 (James Madison); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 42 at 289-92 (James Madison).
68. The cyclical nature of nonelectoral policy may deter tribally partisan action, and it
may mitigate the impact of tribally partisan action when it does occur (though those who are
injured today may not be exactly the same individuals who gain in a future cycle). But it is
important to emphasize that the potential for cyclical retribution does not justify conduct that
is indefensible on its own merits.
69. This is at least true for partisan effects that are not only favored by one party but that
also promote that party’s electoral success. See supra note 16.
70. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
103, 120-21 (1980); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 595-96 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646-48, 709, 712 (1998); cf. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 60, supra note 42, at 335-37 (Alexander Hamilton) (recognizing the possibility
of legislators’ collusion over their own prospects of re-election, and placing faith in the
different structure of House and Senate and in the diversity of partisan interests—in an era
before the Seventeenth Amendment and consolidation of two major parties—to blunt this
danger); Gerken & Kang, supra note 34, at 87 (noting that “for the last two decades the field
[of election law] has devoted itself” to addressing the principal-agent problem of elected
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partisan impact in electoral rules can blunt the very cyclical wave
that, in other arenas, helps to deter extreme partisanship. A change
to the tax system today that transparently and massively injures
Republicans may well be met by a future change to the tax system
that transparently and massively injures Democrats; a change to
the electoral system today that transparently and massively injures
Republicans may well maintain Democratic control.
The concern above is familiar to scholars of democratic theory.
But there exists a further objection to tribal partisanship in the
electoral realm that is less frequently recognized. In generalized
policy, extreme partisanship is subject to political feedback even
apart from the normal political cycle. Extreme partisanship in, for
example, tax policy, may not only exact retribution in a future
political period, but may also help further a political shift to the out-
party. Despite stark divisions in personal partisan affiliation and
policy preferences, many Americans favor the idea of compromise71
and tend to dislike displays of excessive partisanship, even when
the displays are purely symbolic.72 There is at least the theoretical
possibility that unadulterated and unrestrained responsive or tribal
partisanship will translate to displeasure expressed at the polls,
even by co-partisans. That is, the possibility exists that extreme
responsive or tribal partisanship generates at least some marginal
cost when deployed in the service of environmental regulation,
health care, or tax policy. Moreover, distaste for such partisanship
need not be felt by a majority of co-partisans in order to be meaning-
ful. If an incumbent Democrat believes that her hyperpartisan
stance on tax policy will disillusion just five percent of her own
representatives legislating to favor themselves).
71. See Ronald Brownstein, Public to Congress: Bend, Don’t Break, NAT’L J. DAILY, July
24, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 15508712; Tim Mak, Poll: Americans Want Compromise,
POLITICO (Sept. 27, 2011, 7:32 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/64499.html;
Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Trends in American Values: 1987-2012:
Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years 55 (June 4, 2012), http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf. That said, even the idea of
partisan compromise reflects a partisan divide: Democrats apparently favor compromise to
a greater degree than Republicans. See id.
72. See Daniel Strauss, Poll: Americans Want Bipartisan Seating at State of the Union,
THE HILL (Jan. 21, 2011, 1:40 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/139353-
poll-americans-want-bipartisan-seating-at-state-of-the-union (citing a poll claiming that 72
percent of Americans said that Republicans and Democrats should sit together at the State
of the Union address).
1814 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1787
Democratic voters simply based on their dislike of excess, and that
disillusionment will jeopardize their turnout for her in the next
election, the prospect of disillusioning her own supporters should
serve as a deterrent in any jurisdiction where races are mildly
competitive.73
73. This possibility may be more theoretical than real, given the low salience of most
particularized political action and the limited range of competitive electorates. If it happened
at all, the path to electoral payback would likely come from a highly motivated set of
opponents combining with a set of proponents mildly disillusioned by a partisan overreach
and, therefore, modestly less enthusiastic about turning out to vote. 
In a noncompetitive electorate, even this combination may not be sufficient to deliver
electoral payback. Consider the 2011 Maryland redistricting plan, which was widely portrayed
as an illegitimate Democratic act of tribal partisanship, even by media endorsing Democratic
candidates. See, e.g., Editorial, Cardin for Senate, BALT. SUN, NOV. 1, 2012, available at 2012
WLNR 23298154; Editorial, Obama for President, BALT. SUN, Nov. 4, 2012, available at 2012
WLNR 23571683; Against Question 5, BALT. SUN, Oct. 21, 2012, at 24A, available at 2012
WLNR 22406045 (“Maryland’s congressional maps are a product of the politicians, for the
politicians, by the politicians. They were born of the two competing desires of the state’s
Democratic Party bosses: to give incumbent Democrats the precincts they want to make their
re-election efforts easier, and to put one of the state’s two Republican-held congressional seats
at risk.”).
There was a referendum on the congressional map in 2012. It is unclear whether the vote
against the map attracted any Democrats who were displeased with the display of tribal
partisanship, over and above Republicans and third-party candidates with presumably
stronger reactions to the adverse partisan action. The vote against the map (36 percent)
mirrored the Republican vote for President (36 percent), overperformed the two-party
Republican vote for U.S. Senate (32 percent), and significantly underperformed the combined
Senate tally of the Republican candidate and the independent, formerly Republican,
challenger (43 percent). Official 2012 Presidential General Election Results for All State
Questions, MD. STATE BD. ELECTIONS (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:56 AM), http://elections.state.md.us/
elections/2012/results/general/gen_qresults_2012_4_00_1.html (Question 5); Official 2012
Presidential General Election Results for President of the United States, MD. STATE BD.
ELECTIONS  (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:56 AM), http: // elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/results/
general/gen_results_2012_4_001-.html; Official 2012 Presidential General Election Results for
U.S. Senator, MD. STATE BD. ELECTIONS (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:56 AM), http://elections.state.md.us/
elections/2012/results/general/gen_results_2012_4_007-.html. 
Moreover, the wording of the ballot question would have presented a referendum on tribal
partisanship for only the most informed voters. 2012 General Election Ballot Question
Language, MD. STATE BD. ELECTIONS, http://elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/ballot_
question_language.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (Question 5 read: “[e]stablishes the
boundaries for the State’s eight United States Congressional Districts based on recent census
figures, as required by the United States Constitution”). Even if some Democrats did defect
from their immediate partisan interest based on a dislike of tribal partisanship, the maps
were nevertheless overwhelmingly approved, by 64 percent of those voting on the question.
Official 2012 Presidential General Election Results for All State Questions, supra (Question
5).
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Partisan impact in electoral rules blunts this feedback mecha-
nism. As long as a policy’s electoral impact on the other “team”
exceeds the marginal loss in votes from the official’s own “team” due
to the disfavored display of partisanship, policymakers have ample
incentive to drive electoral policy based on tribal partisanship, even
against the wishes of some of their own constituents. Consider an
elected Democratic official in a jurisdiction where half of her
constituents are Democrats and half are Republicans. If her
hyperpartisan election regulation causes five percent of her own
Democratic voters to become disillusioned and withhold their
support, the regulation will nevertheless be in her immediate elec-
toral interest if it leaves at least six percent of opposing Republicans
unable or unwilling to vote. In electoral regulation, actions inspired
by tribal partisanship may not represent an impregnable barrier to
electoral feedback, but they can serve as formidable seawalls
limiting the impact of a naturally reactive tide.74
I want to be clear: I am not asserting that all, or even much, of
the partisan impact of policy generally, or electoral policy in partic-
ular, is actually driven by the most extreme form of tribal partisan-
ship. Tribal partisanship is probably, in most circumstances, the
exception rather than the norm. Indeed, it is surely the rare policy
driven by any one of the above archetypes of partisanship in
isolation. Policymakers are, I suspect, normally driven by a
combination of motives—say, an ideological preference for a certain
policy arguably in the public interest, which is seen as responsive to
the expressed preferences of aligned partisan constituents, and
74. To be sure, these “seawalls” may result from any extreme partisan effect, even when
caused by coincidental partisanship. But as demonstrated in this Part, there are greater
incentives to engage in tribal partisanship in the electoral realm. And it is to be expected that
tribal partisanship will reliably cause extreme partisan effect more often than other forms of
partisanship along the spectrum simply because partisan effect is the aim of tribal partisan-
ship. Moreover, because partisan effect is the exclusive aim of tribal partisanship, there are
no countervailing socially beneficial considerations that mitigate in favor of normatively
tolerating the partisan effect of tribal partisanship in the electoral realm.
Indeed, the most plausible defense of tribal partisanship in the electoral realm is no defense
at all. It is merely a protestation that tribal partisanship cannot be prevented without also
preventing more beneficial forms of partisanship: that this range of the spectrum cannot
meaningfully be isolated. I am not so sure. I discuss various methods for confronting different
forms of partisanship, including methods with the potential to isolate tribal partisanship in
Part III.
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which may also be perceived as damaging to the other side.75 That
said, given the natural temptations of tribal partisanship in the
electoral arena, there are unfortunate examples of electoral actions
that are difficult to explain based on anything other than the
narrowest forms of the most reprehensible motivation.76
Redistricting, often described as a “bloodsport,”77 seems particu-
larly susceptible to tribal partisan impulses.78 As I have elsewhere
recounted:
In 2001, ... a federal judge described the redistricting process for
Madison County, Illinois, as full of “threats, coercion, bullying,
and a skewed view of the law,” with the process “so far short of
representing the electorate that it seems the citizens of Madison
County were not so much as an afterthought.” Said the redis-
tricting committee chairman to one of his committee colleagues:
“We are going to shove [the map] up your f------ a-- and you are
going to like it, and I’ll f--- any Republican I can.”79
75. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1695.
76. See Tokaji, supra note 66, at 434.
77. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 588 (1993); Howard Fineman,
1986: Year of the Seesaw, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 1986, at 32.
78. Consider the Republican State Leadership Committee, which boasted of its own
“strategy and execution of its efforts in the 2010 election cycle to erect a Republican firewall
through the redistricting process that paved the way to Republicans retaining a U.S. House
majority in 2012.... The rationale was straightforward: ... Drawing new district lines in states
with the most redistricting activity presented the opportunity to solidify conservative
policymaking at the state level and maintain a Republican stronghold in the U.S. House of
Representatives for the next decade.” REDMAP 2012 Summary Report, REPUBLICAN STATE
LEADERSHIP COMM. (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.rslc.com/redmap_2012_summary_report.
79. JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 13 (2010) (quoting Hulme v.
Madison Cnty., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044, 1051 (S.D. Ill. 2001)).
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The quote above sounds extreme.80 But most commentators have
not had the theoretical tools to articulate a distinction between
Madison County and Mayberry81 in the regulation of the electoral
process. Undifferentiated notions of partisanship conflate actions
that have partisan impact but are driven by pursuit of a goal with
public-regarding bona fides and those that are driven by a desire to
“f--- any Republican I can.”82
The Supreme Court has also not escaped this unnecessary
myopia. Indeed, the Court’s lack of insight may well be responsible
for substantial clouds in the doctrine. The best example is the
Court’s approach to partisan gerrymandering, explored most
recently in Vieth v. Jubelirer.83 Vieth concerned a claim that the
2002 Pennsylvania legislature, under unified Republican control
and with a Republican governor approving the legislation, adopted
a congressional redistricting plan that amounted to a partisan
gerrymander.84 The Court’s opinion was fractured. A four-Justice
plurality, reviewing what it considered to be the Court’s failed
intervention into the “political thicket,” considered the claim
nonjusticiable;85 four Justices in dissent proposed several different
standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims;86 and
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, found a claim of
80. And, indeed, as demonstrated below, it is extreme. But it is not completely singular.
See Shaila Dewan, Fighting to Regain Right Some Felons Never Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2008, at A21, available at 2008 WLNR 4135758 (quoting the chairman of the Alabama
Republican Party, referring to a statute facilitating the enfranchisement of some persons with
felony convictions, as saying, “As frank as I can be, we’re opposed to it because felons don’t
tend to vote Republican.”); Dara Kam & John Lantigua, Former Florida GOP Leaders Say
Voter Suppression Was Reason They Pushed New Election Law, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 25,
2012, available at 2012 WLNR 25062079 (“A new Florida law ... was intentionally designed
by Florida GOP staff and consultants to inhibit Democratic voters, former GOP officials and
current GOP consultants have told The Palm Beach Post.”).
81. Mayberry was, to many, the idealized epitome of small-town America. See Martha
Waggoner, Beloved Actor Gave Us Mayberry, Dies at 86, DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights,
Ill.), July 4, 2012, at 1, available at 2012 WLNR 14147077.
82. See Tokaji, supra note 66, at 434 (recognizing the difference between ideological
partisanship and tribal partisanship, albeit not in those terms).
83. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
84. Id. at 272-73 (plurality opinion).
85. Id. at 305-06.
86. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346-47 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 356,
365-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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political gerrymandering theoretically justiciable but did not locate
an acceptable standard for “justishing”87 such claims.88
All of the Justices seem to have labored through the misconcep-
tion of partisanship as a unitary object, available only in lesser or
greater degree.89 That is, the Justices accepted the framing of the
problem as a search for the threshold level of “too much partisan-
ship,”90 in part because they did not have the analytical structure to
define a search for partisanship of an appropriate type. Consider the
Justices’ complaint that they were unable to define a particular
threshold level of constitutionally troublesome partisan effect.91 This
is an unusual requirement for a claim of constitutional wrong: in
other contexts, the Court has found unconstitutional even minimal
cognizable disparate impact when caused by an impermissible
purpose.92 Most of the Vieth Justices demanded more. They sought
a demonstrable threshold level of partisan effect because they could
not accept that minimal partisan effect, when caused by an
87. The delightful verb is attributed to Professor Gary King. See Sam Hirsch, The United
States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional
Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 204 (2003).
88. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
89. Indeed, the plurality seemed to conflate partisanship with politics. See id. at 285
(plurality opinion) (stating, in discussing claims of excessive partisan gerrymandering, that
“[t]he Constitution clearly contemplates districting by political entities, see Article I, § 4, and
unsurprisingly that turns out to be root-and-branch a matter of politics”); id. (“[I]t would be
quixotic to attempt to bar state legislatures from considering politics as they redraw district
lines....” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). All redistricting is political,
in the sense that it requires contested choices about government action; in this sense,
redistricting is no more or less political than any other public act. Cf. Levitt, supra note 65,
at 517-18 (arguing that redistricting is both political and pre-political, because it not only
responds to, but defines, the relevant cleavages in a jurisdiction). And all redistricting is
political, in the sense that all redistricting affects the likelihood that particular represent-
atives will be elected. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing
Legislative Districts, 9 POL’Y STUD. J. 839, 839-40 (1981). The vast majority of redistricting
also has partisan effects, in that different parties will be bolstered or harmed by different
redistricting plans—though the political effects and the partisan effects may not always be
the same. And each of these claims is distinct from a claim that redistricting is, or must
necessarily be, undertaken with a particular form of partisan intent.
90. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 281-83, 287-91; id. at 306-309 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In
contrast, for example, Justice Stevens found a harm in the communicative impact of any
improper partisan intent. Id. at 331-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (Equal Protection Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Establishment
Clause).
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impermissible partisan purpose, would suffice. This is because they
were unable to accept that a partisan purpose could be deemed truly
impermissible; they viewed partisan purpose as both omnipresent
and inevitable.93 And they viewed partisan purpose as omnipresent
and inevitable only because they could not see that all partisan
purposes are not alike: that is, that there is a spectrum of partisan-
ship.
In a companion piece, I explore the roads not taken in Vieth.94 It
is possible that, despite a strong line of cases disfavoring detrimen-
tal government action solely on the basis of protected political
association,95 the Court would have constitutionally blessed tribal
partisanship. It is also possible that the Court would have refused
to bless tribal partisanship, but recognized evidentiary limitations
linked to its institutional role, and declared itself unable to reliably
distinguish one form of partisanship from another in a litigation
setting.96 For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to claim
that the result in Vieth would have been different or should have
been different. It is enough to claim that without understanding the
spectrum of partisanship, the Court was blind to the possibility of
a different approach.
III. CONFRONTING PARTISANSHIP
Anecdotes like the Madison County experience and the knuckles
bared during Pennsylvania’s redistricting capture attention, at least
within the limited sphere of attention that fights over the details of
electoral regulations are ever able to capture. Advocates and
commentators have, accordingly, devoted substantial time to
confronting concerns about undue partisanship in the establishment
of electoral policy and—related, but distinct—concerns that the
public perceives electoral policy to be unduly partisan. It should be
clear from the discussion above that partisanship is neither
uniformly nor universally reviled. Revealing the spectrum of
partisanship helps observers deploy the most appropriately targeted
93. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion).
94. See Justin Levitt, Problems of Public Purpose (working title) (on file with author).
95. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57, 359-60 (1976).
96. Cf. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001) (indicating difficulty in discerning
legislative intent based on race rather than politics or partisanship).
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design choices to foster the forms of partisanship they prefer and
confront or combat partisanship in the manifestations they find less
benevolent.
Similarly, parsing the spectrum of partisanship contributes
meaningfully to evaluating efforts at “nonpartisanship.”97 Efforts to
combat particular forms of partisanship are too readily caricatured
as fool’s quests for “nonpartisan” individuals to take “nonpartisan”
action.98 Very few—perhaps vanishingly few—individuals are truly
nonpartisan, in the sense that they have absolutely no private
personal preference for the announced ideological commitments of
major political parties.99 And particularly in the arena of electoral
regulation, very few—and perhaps no—actions are truly nonparti-
san, in the sense that they have absolutely no differential impact on
those affiliated with one party or another. But most efforts to
restrain partisanship, mischaracterized as nonpartisan, do not
depend on a quest for these unicorns.
Instead, the search for nonpartisanship is more properly under-
stood as a search for the absence of, or constraints on, a particular
form or forms of partisanship in the spectrum described above.
Often, the partisanship targeted is tribal partisanship: promotion
of one’s own partisan fortunes or the opposition’s partisan misfor-
tunes purely for its own sake and wholly independent of any
conceivable notion of the common good. Under the right conditions,
individuals and entities can and do forego extremes of tribal partis-
anship in practice all the time;100 it is not pollyannish to consciously
97. The term has many meanings. See George K. Yin, The Role of Nonpartisan Staff in the
Legislative Process 7-9 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 2013-03, 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2261221 (describing just a few).
98. Cf. Dixon, supra note 89, at 840 (“My own experience tells me that although I may find
nonpartisanship in heaven, in the real world ... there are no nonpartisans, although there may
be noncombatants.”).
99. It is important to understand that individuals who do not choose to affiliate with or
belong to a political party are rarely truly nonpartisan. Studies consistently demonstrate that
most people who are not inclined to become members of a political party—who are not
identified or registered as Democrats, Republicans, Greens, et cetera—nevertheless demon-
strate reliable voting patterns aligned with a single consistent political party. See sources
cited supra note 11. This is likely true for officials as well. See, e.g., Barry C. Burden et al.,
Selection Method, Partisanship, and the Administration of Elections, 41 AM. POL. RES. 903,
918-19 (2013) (finding that more than two-thirds of nonpartisan Wisconsin election officials
expressed a personal partisan preference).
100. See infra Part III.C-D.
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seek those conditions in institutional design. As a corollary, it is
unsurprising that a “nonpartisan” model aimed specifically at tribal
partisanship would not necessarily be tailored to rooting out
responsive, ideological, or coincidental partisanship (or partisan
effects from any of the three). Indeed, such a model may—without
any inconsistency—be agnostic with respect to these other forms of
partisanship, or even attempt to promote them. Different models
will seek to address different types of partisanship to different
degrees or with different degrees of priority.
Sophisticated assessments of efforts to combat undue partisan-
ship in electoral regulation must therefore transcend casual
deriding of a “nonpartisan” fantasy. They must instead focus on the
particular type or types of partisanship to be confronted in any
given context, with attention to the ways in which distinct regula-
tory models have the capacity to constrain partisanship at various
points along the spectrum.
A. Rules Regulating Effect
One strategy to confront partisanship in the rules of the electoral
process is to focus on partisan effect. Indeed, aiming directly at
effect may be the only means to confront the impact of coincidental
partisanship.101
For good reason, calls to eliminate partisan effect entirely are
extraordinarily rare. Indeed, in the electoral context, I have seen
such a proposal only in the redistricting process—and there, only in
the suggestion to draw districts with no partisan bias.102 Partisan
101. In addition to the strategies discussed below, some proposals would eliminate partisan
effect by eliminating entirely the premise for electoral regulation. For example, some would
cut the Gordian knot of partisanship in redistricting by eliminating districts entirely and
using alternative voting systems like cumulative voting or choice voting to select members of
multimember bodies. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994)
(describing alternatives to plurality voting); Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue,
Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 251-56 (same).
102. Cf. Alexander v. Taylor, 51 P.3d 1204, 1219 (Okla. 2002) (Opala, J., dissenting in part)
(recommending that courts refrain from accepting “any tendered party-sponsored plan laden
with excisable partisan bias, however slight”).
Presumably, even a proposal this stringent would be confined to eliminating partisan bias
for the Democratic and Republican parties, which is not necessarily a result devoid of partisan
effect on third parties. Though intriguing to contemplate, it is well beyond the scope of this
Article to evaluate whether it is possible to arrive at a stable equilibrium for a redistricting
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bias is a measure of the extent to which redistricting plans favor a
particular party consistently over time, such that the party is
statistically likely to win more seats with a certain percentage of the
vote than its opposing party would.103 For example, if districts were
drawn such that Republicans would be likely to win 58 percent of a
given jurisdiction’s seats with 52 percent of the votes in that
jurisdiction, but Democrats would be likely to win only 54 percent
of the seats with 52 percent of the votes, the district’s plan would
have a partisan bias favoring Republicans.104 Districts drawn with
partisan bias yield an inherent structural advantage, allowing one
party to gain legislative seats based on a given generalized level of
support more easily than its rivals. Zero partisan bias—also known
as perfect partisan symmetry—would eliminate such structural
advantage, with no room even for coincidental partisanship in the
design of district lines.105
plan with zero partisan bias among three or more political parties. See Gary King, Electoral
Responsiveness and Partisan Bias in Multiparty Democracies, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 159, 163-65,
(1990) (describing the calculations necessary to such an evaluation).
103. See Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial
Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 8 (2007); Gary
King & Robert X. Browning, Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional
Elections, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (1987).
104. Partisan bias is often confused with disproportion. Disproportion simply refers to a
difference between the composition of the electorate and the composition of a representative
body. For example, in a jurisdiction where 52 percent of the voters are Democrats, a
disproportion would result if greater (or less) than 52 percent of the legislative delegation
were Democrats. This sort of deviation from strictly proportional representation is likely in
any system that does not set out to distribute representation proportionally by party, and all
but inherent in any system that elects representatives from districts that are not perfectly
homogenous by party. See Grofman & King, supra note 103, at 8-9. In any such system, there
will be a minority in each district—say, 42 Democrats in a 100-voter Republican district—and
the results will be proportional only upon the coincidence that an equal number of opposing-
party voters are minorities in their respective districts.
Put differently, the partisan effect of a deviation from perfect proportionality is inherent
not only in the choice of redistricting lines but in the fact of districted single-member
elections. Much of the partisan impact of the pure disproportion inherent in districted
elections, however, should not reliably and consistently favor one party over time. To the
extent that specific lines are designed in a way that does produce a consistent effect, that
effect is measured by the calculation of partisan bias.
105. Note that adopting this standard for the first time would presumably involve a
partisan effect with respect to the status quo. Few existing maps display perfect partisan
symmetry, and a move in that direction would therefore usually involve gain for one party and
loss for another relative to the map enacted in a prior cycle.
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Such dramatic proposals have dramatic consequences. Virtually
every means of dividing a jurisdiction into districts will have some
reliable and identifiable (even if unintentional) partisan impact.
This is a product of dividing people into districts, not a product of
any given method. It will be true whether a legislature, a commis-
sion, a computer algorithm, or a random number generator performs
the task, simply because different district configurations naturally
and predictably favor different constellations of voters. The only way
to ensure the complete absence of partisan bias is to expressly and
exclusively prioritize partisan symmetry: to draw districts that
achieve partisan symmetry no matter what the other consequences,
and fulfill other objectives only to the extent that they do not result
in districts reliably favoring or disfavoring any particular party. Put
differently, in most jurisdictions, driving first and foremost toward
partisan symmetry will necessarily put dramatic limits on other
legal and policy objectives106—limiting drawers’ ability to comply
with the Voting Rights Act, recognize communities or political
boundaries, or encourage districts that are responsive to changes in
public opinion.107
The corollary and more general point is that, in redistricting and
beyond, some degree of partisan impact at the end of the day is
usually the necessary price of policy flexibility to accomplish other
objectives. And perhaps as a result, to my knowledge, no jurisdiction
in the country has attempted to put an inflexible zero-partisan-
effect mandate into practice in any sphere of electoral regulation.108
Of course, partisan effect repudiated in extremes may be tolerated
in minor doses. To use the same redistricting example, it is possible
to test a redistricting plan for partisan bias, and to attempt to limit
106. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1402-04 (2012).
107. Generally, the more starkly noncompetitive a district is—the more reliably “safe
Democrat” or “safe Republican”—the more reliably it can be matched with a corresponding
safe district likely to vote for a candidate of the opposing party. At the extreme, if every
district in a jurisdiction were entirely “safe” to the same degree, and the districts were divided
evenly between the major parties, the resulting plan would show zero partisan bias. Each
party would predictably win the same percentage of seats no matter what the distribution of
the vote.
108. Indeed, even the foremost proponents of the use of partisan bias measurements as a
buttress against undue partisan gerrymandering do not recommend the adoption of a zero-
bias standard. See Grofman & King, supra note 103, at 21-25 (recommending that courts
consider five different standards using partisan bias but not a zero-bias standard).
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that bias, without demanding that a plan exhibit zero bias. Such an
approach would be entirely internally consistent. One might, for
example, set an outer threshold on the degree of acceptable partisan
bias or require that partisan bias be minimized given other
superseding constraints.109 In either situation, the objective would
be to constrain but not eradicate partisan effect, no matter what
form of partisanship was the cause.
Some states have actually implemented this sort of direct “outer
threshold” approach to constraining partisan effects—or, more
accurately, some states have legal provisions embracing such
approaches that are at least theoretically enforceable. For example,
again in the redistricting context, several state laws purport to
impose limits on the permissible partisan effect of any given district.
Hawaii’s constitution states that “[n]o district shall be so drawn as
to unduly favor a person or political faction.”110 Delaware law is
similar: “Each district shall, insofar as is possible ... [n]ot be created
so as to unduly favor any person or political party.”111 The “so as to”
formulation is not free of ambiguity: it might represent an injunc-
tion against districting undertaken “in order to” unduly favor (that
is, a constraint on partisan intent), or it might represent an
injunction against districting “that has the effect of” unduly favoring
(that is, a constraint on impact). Neither of these provisions appears
to have been further construed by the courts or used as the basis to
overturn a redistricting map, nor is it clear how “undue” favoritism
in any particular district would be assessed.112 Still, these laws at
least plausibly represent a rare statutory attempt to constrain
partisan effects directly.113
109. See id.
110. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2).
111. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804(4) (West 2013); see also Act Establishing a
Reapportionment Commission, 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 389, § 2(d) (“Congressional and state
legislative districts ..., to the extent practicable, shall reflect ... the right of all Rhode Islanders
to fair representation and equal access to the political process.”).
112. In particular, neither articulation fits particularly well with the partisan bias measure
discussed above. Partisan bias is a measure applicable to a legislative districting plan as a
whole and not designed to yield a usable measurement conducive to deciding whether any
particular district is “unduly” partisan.
113. Federal constitutional rulings directly attacking partisan effect are even rarer. The
effects standard announced in partisan gerrymandering cases like Davis v. Bandemer may
perhaps represent an example of such an outer limit. Bandemer established an effects
standard dependent on an arrangement of the electoral system “that will consistently degrade
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A second method of constraining partisan effect involves sharp
restraints on outcomes other than partisan effect, which are really
just restraints on discretion more generally. If individuals may act
only within a limited menu of permissible options, it may be
unlikely, depending on the nature of the constraint, that the action
will result in the most extreme partisan effects. For example, strict
campaign finance limits on the amount of money that an individual
or entity may contribute to a candidate—whatever their other policy
merits or detriments—may serve this function.114 With a finite
number of real persons each able to contribute directly a finite
number of dollars, contribution limits will not prevent partisan bias,
but they may cap it. And in redistricting, rules allowing officials
very little flexibility to deviate from county boundaries will also
allow very little flexibility to pursue partisan outcomes beyond those
already embedded in county configurations. It is important to note
that both of these examples are very different from efforts to
minimize partisan effect. Contribution limits and existing county
boundaries may well yield a rather skewed partisan effect (as well
as desirable or undesirable effects on other dimensions). Instead,
the point is merely that the tighter the constraint on official action,
the more the partisan effect will be baked into the limitation, with
little opportunity for partisan impact to expand beyond that
inherent limit.115
Finally, entities may seek to constrain (though not eliminate)
partisan effects by attempting to curb or eliminate various forms of
partisan intent. Prohibiting tribal and responsive partisanship, for
example, would limit partisan effects to those caused by coincidental
and ideological partisanship. This, too, is no guarantee of minimiz-
a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.” 478 U.S. 109, 132
(1986) (plurality opinion). Such unconstitutionality remains premised on an additional finding
of express intent to discriminate against voters on the basis of partisanship, id. at 127, which
makes it an awkward fit for a category of rules aimed only at the partisan effect of a public
act. On the other hand, it may be that Bandemer ’s extreme standard could never be met
under circumstances arising coincidentally.
114. The fact that contribution limits may end up serving this function does not imply that
they are intended to serve this function. And it may be that the potential degree of partisan
bias permitted under a regime of contribution limits is sufficiently large that, for practical
purposes, it does not feel like a meaningful cap at all.
115. Of course, the tighter the constraint on official action, the more it may preclude policy
choices beneficial for reasons beyond their partisan impact. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 526-
29.
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ing partisan effects; it may be that the partisan effect of ideological
partisanship is, in any given circumstance, quite substantial. But it
may rein in the most extreme partisan effects achievable only with
a direct intent to maximize partisan impact. I address these sorts of
limitations on partisan intent below.116
B. Structural Design
A second strategy to confront partisanship in the electoral process
is through the structure of the decision-making body. In many ways,
this is a preoccupation of current scholarship; the “new institution-
alism” of election law work has naturally led to a focus on institu-
tional design.117 Some of my own work has been in this vein: I have,
for example, examined the capacity of independent commissions to
blunt some of the most self-interested tribal partisanship of the
redistricting process.118 But in many ways, this is also a preoccupa-
tion that is quite old. The basic conception of the separation of
powers, the bicameral national legislature, and the federal reliance
on competing state and national governments all mark attempts to
blunt the force of faction through structure.119
Structure is unquestionably important. The structure of public
institutions should be expected to further some forms of partisan-
ship and mitigate others. Legislatures elected in partisan contests,
for example, are designed to promote ideological (and perhaps
responsive)120 partisanship. We not only expect that a legislator will
vote in line with his or her ideological precommitments (and most
likely with the wishes of like-minded constituents), but in many
ways, the idea of republican representation through partisan
elections relies on the assumption that the expectation will prove
116. See infra Part III.B-D.
117. See Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law
Scholarship, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 86, 86-87 (Guy-
Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From
Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 126 (2009); Richard L. Hasen, Election
Administration Reform and the New Institutionalism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1075, 1076, 1087-88
(2010) (book review).
118. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 530-42. 
119. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949-51 (1983); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note
42, at 51-52 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 42, at 289-92 (James
Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 42, at 350-53 (James Madison).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
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true. In these systems, ideological partisanship, at the least, is a
feature, not a bug. Given the close connection to legislators’ own
employment fortunes and opportunities for advancement through
party-based legislative power structures, tribal partisanship is also
lamentably to be expected in partisan elected legislatures, absent
other constraints. One might expect the same, absent other con-
straints,121 from those in the executive or judiciary chosen through
partisan elections.
In contrast, nonpartisan elections may not alone prevent
responsive or tribal partisanship—after all, there may be a close
connection between parties and candidates in nonpartisan elections
everywhere other than the ballot122—but neither should nonpartisan
elections systematically foster tribal partisanship. That difference
can be significant. And appointed officials’ structural proclivity to
various forms of partisanship will, all else equal, likely vary based
on their proximity to or dependence on the partisanship of those
who appoint them.
Other structural rules or limitations, beyond the selection
process,123 may serve to counter or defuse some forms of partisan-
ship. Supermajority rules, for example, are often designed to blunt
not only partisan intent (of all kinds) but also partisan effects, by
limiting a narrow majority’s ability to control policy unilaterally.
The same is true for bipartisan or multipartisan structures with a
balanced partisan composition.124
121. These other—quite powerful—restraints are discussed below. See infra Part III.C.
122. See, e.g., Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 747-48 (9th
Cir. 2012) (holding that political parties have a First Amendment right to endorse and to
publicize their endorsement of judicial candidates in a nonpartisan election).
123. Some believe that automated procedures allow policymakers to forego a “selection
process” entirely, and thereby amount to a structural constraint on partisanship. As I have
discussed elsewhere, these automated procedures must be programmed somehow; any
fostering of, or limitation on, particular forms of partisanship will be embedded in the
mechanism by which programmers are selected. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 522-25. 
124. Of course, these structures are not themselves sufficient to block all partisanship,
including tribal partisanship. For example, neither supermajority requirements nor balanced
bipartisan structures may prevent a redistricting majority from targeting specific out-party
competitors based purely on their identity or partisan affiliation, by “buying off” enough out-
party allies to acquire a supermajority. And similarly, neither supermajority requirements
nor balanced bipartisan structures will prevent a partisan contingent from refusing to consent
to action based purely on the partisan affiliation of individuals affected, leaving the body
powerless to act. Where the body bestows or withdraws benefits, a partisan contingent may
prevent the distribution of benefits to individuals affiliated with the opposing party or the
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Timing rules represent another form of structural constraint that
may be designed to limit short-term responsive or tribal partisan-
ship. These features entail decisions undertaken with some gap
between the decision and its implementation; the idea is that
policymakers will be less able to tailor the policies they prefer to
achieve partisan consequences if they do not know exactly how
implementation will proceed. Examples include districts that take
effect years down the road when the local political climates may
have shifted,125 or regulations of election procedures drawn up
before it is apparent that they will benefit or disfavor certain voters
or candidates.126 Strong stare decisis rules may play a similar role
in the judiciary. These structures blunt the most aggressive forms
of tribal partisanship by making it more difficult to reliably know
how decisions will affect particular electoral prospects in the future.
Finally, despite all of the ink spilled on judicial review over the
centuries, few have noted that judicial review may be seen as
another structural protection against the most extreme forms of
partisanship. The very fact that a court is watching and prepared to
enforce substantive rules helps to confine partisan effect and
partisan intent within a permissible, albeit quite broad, zone. And
the process of judicial review might, at least in theory, smoke out
policies explicable purely by tribal partisanship.127 Those who have
watched the redistricting process, and the Supreme Court’s steady
abdication of any role in policing partisan gerrymandering, may
believe that such a structural constraint amounts to little. Still,
even with unilateral partisan control, no major party in any
withdrawal of benefits from like-minded partisans. Where the body is an enforcement body,
a partisan contingent may prevent enforcement against like-minded affiliated partisans. The
Federal Election Commission (FEC) is structurally designed in this fashion. See, e.g., Kenneth
A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 279, 286 (1991) (“[P]arty-line deadlocks reduce the chance that the
Commission will investigate violations of the law....”). But see Michael M. Franz, The Devil
We Know? Evaluating the Federal Election Commission As Enforcer, 8 ELECTION L.J. 167, 176-
77 (2009) (showing only 19 party-line three-to-three deadlocks of 1342 votes evaluated in
enforcement actions by the FEC over several recent years). 
125. See Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412, 412
(2006). 
126. See Flanders, supra note 1.
127. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203-04 (2008) (plurality
opinion) (examining legislation passed on partisan lines for justifications other than tribal
partisanship and implying a capacity to distinguish when no such justifications exist).
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jurisdiction has yet attempted to legislate its chief competitor
completely out of existence, despite substantial short-term incen-
tives to do so. It is likely that the institutional power of the judiciary
stands as one explanation why such partisan displays still remain
beyond the pale.
C. The Limits of Rules and Structure As Constraints on         
Partisanship
The substantive rules and institutional structures discussed
above have dominated analysts’ discussions of constraints on
partisanship. Still, despite the ability of both substantive rules and
institutional structure to constrain partisanship, it remains too easy
to overstate their impact. This seems to be a lesson that many
theorists of both “Old Institutionalism” and “New Institutionalism”
alike have brushed briskly past. Substantive rules and institutional
structure alone are insufficient to constrain certain forms of
partisanship in theory, or to explain their absence in practice. It
takes more than zoning permission and a good architect to make a
house a home.128
Consider, for example, a hypothetical commission designed to
draw district lines; the commission is populated by individuals
carefully screened to ensure that none is beholden to a particular
incumbent, and there is no indication that any individual commis-
sioner has any particular electoral ambitions of her own. To mute
ideological partisanship, the commission is structured to include an
equal number of registered Democrats and registered Republi-
cans.129 To mute coincidental partisanship, the commission must
follow county lines where doing so would not violate constitutional
equipopulation mandates130 or federal statutes like the Voting
Rights Act.131
128. Cf. THE STAPLE SINGERS, Hammer and Nails, on HAMMER AND NAILS (Riverside
Records 1962) (“It takes more than a hammer and nails to make a house a home.”).
129. Note that such a structure would not mute ideological partisanship with respect to
redistricting-related policy commitments shared by adherents of the two major parties but not
by adherents of minor parties.
130. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006).
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These rules and structural elements are typically seen as
meaningful constraints. And yet, with these constraints alone, this
hypothetical commission is not as far from the Madison County
legislature of 2001132 as many likely assume. The federal require-
ments create pockets of substantial discretion for those drawing the
lines. The commissioners may be independent from incumbents and
without self-interested incentives, and yet still be fervent party
enthusiasts.133 Savvy actors will soon discover that they can best
promote their party’s interests through détente.134 In a jurisdiction
that can support rough partisan equity, a fight between rational
opposing forces seeking maximum partisan effect will often resolve
into equal numbers of maximally safe districts, just as surely as a
fight over a dollar yields fifty cents for each equally matched
contestant. True, the resulting lines may contribute rough partisan
equity in the legislative delegation. But rough partisan equity is not
the only conceivable interest to be sought in the design of represen-
tative districts. The incentives of tribal partisanship, bounded only
by substantive rules and institutional structural design, may
overwhelm otherwise beneficial public policy even under conditions
of partisan stalemate.
The above scenario suggests that rules and structure may not
alone constrain the possibility of partisanship—or, at least, of some
forms of partisanship. Real-world examples carry the point one step
further. We can observe many public entities that do not normally
behave in tribally partisan fashion, even when substantive rules
and institutional structure would make such tribal partisanship
possible, and when natural incentives would make it desirable.
These examples make clear that some other phenomenon is doing
much of the real work.
132. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
133. See Peter Callaghan, Redistricting Shows How Far Incumbents Go, NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), Aug. 19, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 17552635 (describing e-mails
revealing that several commissioners on Washington state’s independent redistricting body
seemed to make decisions rife with tribal partisanship).
134. This depends on an assumption that inactivity—and thus default to the courts or to
another backup actor—does not yield significant potential for predictably superior outcomes
for any given party. If one party’s adherents know that they stand a chance at a far better
result by refusing to act, they will naturally prefer to ensure that their process yields no map
at all. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J.
1808, 1812 (2012).
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1. Judiciary
Consider the state court justice system. Despite the American Bar
Association’s contrary recommendation,135 many judges are elected
in partisan contests.136 In several states, lower-court judges elected
in partisan races will have their decisions reviewed by appellate and
supreme court panels comprising judges who were also elected in
partisan races.137 Given the political composition of the electorate
and much of the bench in these states, there is a relatively high
likelihood that litigation will be overseen, from start to finish, by
state-court judges of a single partisan persuasion who were elected
in expressly partisan contests.138 In any given piece of litigation, the
substantive rules of law may provide outer boundaries for partisan-
ship, but judges have plentiful discretion in evidentiary rulings,
sentencing determination, fact-finding, and the application of facts
to law, not to mention construction of ambiguous statutes and the
development of legal rules within the common law. Structural
features like stare decisis and appellate review provide only modest
bolstering of these outer boundaries.139 There is plentiful room with-
in these bounds for judges elected in partisan contests to system-
atically and routinely favor or punish Republican or Democratic
135. AM. BAR ASS’N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY app. A, at 4 (2003), available at http://www.
abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf; cf. Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., Justice for Sale,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25 (promoting merit selection and nonpartisan elections for
the judiciary).
136. Partisan primaries or general elections or both are used, in at least part of a state, to
select Supreme Court justices in nine states, appellate judges in seven states, and trial jud-
ges in fourteen states. See Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.
judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm (last visited Mar. 8,
2014).
137. These states include Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and West Virginia. See id.
138. Supreme Court review of these decisions is unlikely at best. As one of the authors of
the leading Supreme Court practice treatise explains, “The Court never grants certiorari to
review state court applications of state law.” Stephen M. Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The
Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 24 LITIG. 25, 27 (1998). Even without a foray into the
circumstances under which the U.S. Supreme Court will find a reviewable federal issue
embedded in a state case, see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Indiana ex rel.
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938), it suffices for these purposes to note that certiorari
grants are still exceptionally rare, and grants from state courts are rarer still. See, e.g., The
Supreme Court, 2011 Term—The Statistics, 126 HARV. L. REV. 388, 395, 397 (2012).
139. See Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129,
137 (1980).
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litigants, depending on their personal partisan proclivities and their
jurisdiction’s political composition. Many litigants are not pleased
with the delivery of justice in state courts.140 But credible examples
of these judges deciding cases based on responsive or tribal parti-
sanship are notable for their extreme rarity.141 Rules and structure
do not, on their own, explain the manifestation of partisanship or its
absence.
2. Executive
Or consider an example from administrative law. The Federal
Election Commission (FEC) is the agency with responsibility for
federal campaign finance regulation. Its six commissioners are
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate;142 but as
commentators have recognized, “[t]hanks to a well-settled conven-
tion with roots in an earlier, unconstitutional FEC selection pro-
cedure, the FEC really consists of three Democrats and three
Republicans selected by party leaders in Congress and then ‘made
official’ by the White House.”143 Among the FEC’s many responsibili-
ties is a role in the enforcement of campaign finance laws by levying
civil penalties against offenders and referring egregious cases to the
Attorney General.144 But a structural supermajority provision is
built into the statute: at least four votes are required for action.145
140. Cf. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., Special Impeachment Edition, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Dec.
2010), http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/gavel-to-gavel/older-issues/
home/~/media/microsites/Files/Gavel%20to%20Gavel/archived%20pdfs/G%20to%20G%20
Special%20Impeachment.ashx (listing numerous legislative bills seeking to impeach state
court judges as a result of displeasure with judicial rulings).
141. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872-75, 884, 886-87 (2009)
(recounting “exceptional” and “extraordinary” allegations of favoritism based on a state
judge’s response to a particular campaign supporter).
142. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1).
143. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Com-
missions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1443 (2005). Formally, the FEC’s
authorizing statute states only that no more than three of the six commissioners may be
affiliated with the same political party. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1). In practice, the six
commissioners are always three Democrats and three Republicans chosen by congressional
leadership.
144. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d(a)(6), 437g(a)(5).
145. Id. §§ 437c(c), 437g(a)(4)-(6).
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While the judicial example above seems ripe for partisan action,
the FEC setup seems ripe for partisan stasis146—and, indeed, the
FEC has been roundly condemned, early and often, as a poster child
for purported partisan deadlock.147 Even the newest FEC commis-
sioner made headlines recently when she commented, just a few
months after arriving, that “she found the level of partisan division
at the FEC ‘very surprising.’”148
Commissioner Ravel’s general observation, however, could
indicate any of several different forms of partisanship, from narrow
tribal favoritism to ideological disagreement over vigorously
contested terms of campaign finance regulation. Individual enforce-
ment actions help put the observation under a microscope. Most
actors in the federal campaign sphere will be either openly partisan
or primarily aligned with partisan actors, and so it is reasonable to
expect that most entities committing campaign finance violations,
small or large, will similarly be openly partisan or primarily aligned
with partisan actors. When potential enforcement actions arise, a
particular entity is necessarily targeted, and the targeted entity’s
partisanship or perceived partisanship is not only known but often
unavoidably prominent. Moreover, the FEC has great discretion in
this arena; though campaign finance law defines legal violations, no
substantive rule compels Commission action to punish a violation.149
Given this environment, and given the structure of the FEC, one
might expect three-to-three deadlock on every enforcement action.
That is, with blanket authority to choose their own designees, party
leaders should theoretically select commissioners with the incentive
and proclivity to engage in tribal partisanship. Once in office, the
three Democratic commissioners should theoretically vote against
discipline of any Democratic-affiliated targets, and the three
146. See supra note 124.
147. See, e.g., Eliza Newlin Carney, FEC Ruling Leaves Ad Uncertainty, ROLL CALL, Apr.
9, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 7479587 (“[T]he FEC is notorious for partisan deadlocks.”);
Carol Matlack, Frayed Finance Law, NAT’L J., Mar. 5, 1988, at 591, 592; FRED WERTHEIMER
& DON SIMON, THE FEC: THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE COMMISSION, AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y
1 (Jan. 2013), available at https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Wertheimer_and_Simon
__The_Failure_to_Enforce_Commission.pdf.
148. Kenneth P. Doyle, Ravel: ‘Surprising’ Level of Partisanship at FEC Tempering Hopes
for Consensus, Money & Politics Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 4, 2013).
149. Commission authority to proceed beyond conciliation efforts toward a civil penalty is
permissive; essentially, the Commission is given prosecutorial discretion to take action. See
2 U.S.C. § 437g.
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Republican commissioners should theoretically do the same for their
Republican counterparts.150 We should expect enforcement to break
down, three-to-three, in virtually every case against a recognizable
partisan.151
We would expect enforcement to break down consistently, that is,
if substantive rules and structure were the only relevant constraints
on tribal partisanship. Yet actual enforcement practice does not fit
the story of an FEC hopelessly divided in this way.152 A recent study
examined FEC enforcement decisions over several years and found
150. It is possible that individual acts of tribal partisanship with a longer strategic time
horizon would involve voting against one’s fellow partisans. For example, consider MUR 6344,
an FEC enforcement action concerning a union accused of improperly requiring its employees
to support independent advocacy favoring a Democratic congressional campaign. See United
Public Workers, MUR 6344, Statement of Reasons of Chair Caroline C. Hunter and
Commissioners Donald F. McGahn II and Matthew S. Petersen (Fed. Election Comm’n Aug.
7, 2012), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/12044320562.pdf; United Public
Workers, MUR 6344, Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Ellen L. Weintraub and
Commissioners Cynthia L. Bauerly and Steven T. Walther (Fed. Election Comm’n Aug. 7,
2012), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/12044314776.pdf. Three Democratic
appointees supported enforcement action against the union; three Republican appointees did
not. See id.; Commissioners, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/members/
members.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (listing the appointment history of the current
commissioners); Former FEC Commissioners, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/
members/formermembers.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (listing the appointment history
of former commissioners). 
I firmly believe that the three-to-three decision was in fact rooted in ideological
partisanship, guiding the construction of statutory language that was not well designed to
address the given fact pattern. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(f)(2)(iv) (2013) (prohibiting coercion
directed at contributions, but not independent expenditures). It is conceivable, however, that
tribal partisanship was instead the more substantial cause. In light of perceived corporate
resources and partisan leanings, both Democratic and Republican appointees could have
thought that punishing the coercion of employee electoral activity would be in Democrats’
long-term interest. 
Still, whether FEC enforcement votes involve partisans voting for or against fellow
partisans, tribal partisanship should result in three-to-three ties. As explored below, such
deadlocks are the exception rather than the norm. See infra text accompanying notes 152-53. 
151. The caveat about “virtually” every case is necessary because strategic commissioners
might well wish to punish same-party upstarts threatening the perceived interests of party
leadership. The Democratic commissioners, for example, might block enforcement against
aligned Democrats but permit enforcement against Democrats challenging the Democratic
wing of the party with which they agree.
152. Cf. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Commentary, Election Law Miscellany: Enforcement, Access
to Debates, Qualification of Initiatives, 77 TEX. L. REV. 2001, 2017 (1999) (reviewing the
author’s similar experience with California’s campaign finance enforcement body); Keith S.
Brown & Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 789,
790 (2010) (finding that the party affiliation of Federal Communications Commission
commissioners “does not drive voting to the degree one might expect”).
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that of the 1476 votes on enforcement actions, only 19 resulted in
party-line three-to-three deadlocks.153 I think it highly implausible
that all 19 deadlocks represented action undertaken based primarily
on the partisan identity of the targeted entities, rather than
principled disagreements over the proper application of the sub-
stantive law. But even were this the case, these 19 deadlocks would
153. Franz, supra note 124, at 176-77. There are some limits to the conclusions that can
be drawn from this data. Enforcement votes that do not deadlock three-to-three along party
lines may reveal, as suggested in the text, a lack of tribal partisanship. But these four-to-two,
five-to-one, or unanimous votes may also reveal other strategic dynamics. Because a three-
commissioner bloc can preclude a decision to proceed with further enforcement action, it is
possible that commissioners who naturally prefer action nevertheless join colleagues in voting
against action once a three-vote threshold has been reached. That is, perhaps logrolling or
other insincere votes mask an underlying partisanship rate that is higher than three-to-three
splits would suggest. Imagine that three (say) Republican commissioners with tribal partisan
incentives make clear that they will vote against imposing a fine on a Republican respondent.
In such conditions, Democratic commissioners with opposing tribal partisan preferences
would be powerless to achieve the enforcement they desire, and might therefore vote
strategically, casting votes against enforcement for reasons other than their underlying
preference. Such behavior would result in votes that appear to signify greater consensus (and
less tribal partisanship) than the underlying reality.
That said, the strategic benefit of such voting is not clear in this context, where
commissioners need no support from the opposition to block enforcement against their “team.”
And the hypothetical behavior above would explain only majority or supermajority votes
against enforcement, with opposing-party commissioners joining a resolute block of
commissioners refusing to levy fines on their copartisans. It cannot explain majority or
supermajority votes for enforcement. In a regime of tribal partisanship constrained only by
structure and substantive rules, such votes should not exist; in reality, they are fairly
common. See, e.g., In the Matter of Global Settlement with Senator Robert J. Dole for
President, MUR 4382, Certification (Fed. Election Comm’n Sept. 7, 2001) (6-0 vote providing
for civil penalty of $75,000), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/000002D9.pdf;
id., Conciliation Agreement (Fed. Election Comm’n Sept. 26, 2001) (same), available at
http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/000002DA.pdf; In the Matter of DNC Services Corp.,
MUR 4530, Amended Certification (Fed. Election Comm’n Dec. 5, 2001) (5-0 vote providing
for civil penalty of $115,000), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/00000344.pdf;
id., Conciliation Agreement 18 (Fed. Election Comm’n Dec. 6, 2001) (same), available at
http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/00000345.pdf.
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still amount to a tribal partisanship rate of 1.3 percent.154 Some-
thing beyond rules and structure is driving the result.155
3. Legislature
Even the legislature, the public body designed to be most
responsive to public partisan pressures, provides an example of the
explanatory limits of rules and structure. And it does so in the most
surprising of contexts: redistricting.
154. See Franz, supra note 124, at 176-77. A more recent report finds a sharp increase in
the percentage of “split” votes on proposed enforcement actions to 10 percent in 2008 and 2010
and up to 16 percent in 2009. Press Release, Public Citizen, Roiled in Partisan Deadlock,
Federal Election Commission Is Failing (Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/fec-deadlock-statement.pdf. This percentage rose as the number of votes on
enforcement matters fell sharply, caused in part by a 2008 delay in appointing commissioners
and in part by deregulatory Supreme Court decisions like FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S.
449 (2007). The percentage of split votes that were three-to-three party-line deadlocks is not
clear from the report. And of the three-to-three party-line deadlocks, it is not clear how many
may have been due to forms of partisanship other than tribal partisanship; if the drop in total
votes reflects a decrease in otherwise routine matters and a consequent increase in matters
of more contested legal and ideological valence, it would not be surprising to see a spike of
deadlocks due to ideological partisanship.
Moreover, a recent report, quite critical of the FEC, identified several of these split votes
in which Democratic commissioners favored enforcement against Democratic respondents, but
the enforcement action was blocked by Republican commissioners. This is consistent with
ideological partisanship, and possibly responsive partisanship, but precisely the inverse of
what we should normally expect from tribal partisanship. Wertheimer & Simon, supra note
147, at 15-16; cf. Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Deadlocked on Super PAC Ads Backing Democratic
House Candidates, Money & Politics Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 13, 2013) (reviewing an additional vote
by Democratic commissioners to discipline Democratic candidates and by Republican
commissioners against disciplining Democratic candidates). But see supra note 150 (discussing
votes against fellow partisans that might still be motivated by tribal partisanship).
Even if all of the identified split votes did indeed represent tribal partisanship and not
ideological or responsive partisanship, a 16 percent deadlock rate still reveals a condition
other than tribal partisanship operating at least 84 percent of the time.
155. In theory, it is possible that FEC commissioners make tribally partisan enforcement
decisions only in the cases most meaningful to their respective partisan teams, and forego
tribal partisanship on cases perceived to be of lesser consequence. I am grateful to Professor
Rick Hasen for this thought.
Still, I am skeptical that this sort of strategic opportunism explains the observed pattern.
The strategic payoff of the restraint, for example, is not immediately apparent. Why would
the commissioners take tribal positions in 19 of the presumably highest-profile cases, but
forego incremental opportunities to assist their own partisan team in the 1457 incidents
resolved on something other than tribal lines?
But note that even if commissioners found reason to deploy tribal partisanship in 19 cases
while refraining in 1457 others, the 1457 cases of restraint remain unexplained by the rules
or structure of the Commission. I explore an alternative explanation in Part III.D.
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As noted above, redistricting is the substantive area providing the
strongest incentives for legislators to indulge self-interest and
partisan interest over the public interest.156 In most states, the
authority to draw state legislative districts rests with the state
legislature157—in most cases with, in some cases without,158
gubernatorial concurrence. Legislative control of redistricting rules
will predictably foster ideological, responsive, and tribal partisan-
ship, and will thus be expected to yield partisan effects, particularly
with unified partisan control of the lawmaking process.159
Iowa’s much-misunderstood redistricting process is a curious
departure from this model.160 It has been upheld by many as a
national paragon of “nonpartisanship.”161 At first glance, it appears
that both rules and structure are responsible. Iowa’s legislative
services agency (LSA)—a body established by statute as a nonparti-
san agency and that hires employees subject to civil service
procedures and limitations162—maintains ministerial control of the
process. The LSA applies several redistricting criteria set by statute,
which provide outer constraints on the expected partisan effect.163
Where these statutory criteria permit discretion, the LSA must look
for guidance to a commission of nonofficeholders, four of whom are
selected by the legislative leadership but governed by a chair
selected by supermajority vote.164
So far, so good. It appears that both rules and structure would
constrain partisanship in the redistricting process. But the LSA
and its advisory commission are, in a significant sense, merely
placeholders. When the LSA draws congressional and legislative
156. See supra text accompanying note 78.
157. See Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/who-state.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
158. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(a); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a); MD. CONST. art. III,
§ 5; MISS. CONST. art. XIII, § 254; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 22(5).
159. See Grofman & King, supra note 103, at 25 & n.99 (“[S]tudies of past partisan
gerrymanders have shown that most gerrymanders have a partisan bias of 1-3 percentage
points in favor of the party controlling the redistricting.”).
160. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 530 n.33.
161. See, e.g., Glenn D. Magpantay, So Much Huff and Puff: Whether Independent
Redistricting Commissions Are Inconsequential for Communities of Color, 16 ASIAN PAC. AM.
L.J. 4, 11 n.57 (2011).
162. IOWA CODE ANN. § 2A.1(1) (West 2013).
163. Id. §§ 42.4-.6. 
164. Id. §§ 42.5-.6.
1838 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1787
districts, it submits those plans to the state legislature, which may
approve or reject them (and suggest changes).165 If the first plans
are rejected, the LSA will draw an expedited second set of plans,
which the legislature may approve or reject.166 If those second plans
are rejected, the LSA will draw an expedited third set, which the
legislature may approve or reject—or modify at will.167 That is, the
state legislature has the authority to completely revise the LSA
plans for tribally partisan purposes as long as it has sufficient
patience. But in four cycles of redistricting since the LSA took
primary responsibility for the process, the legislature has never
exercised the option to simply substitute its own plan.168
Even more remarkable is the fact that the regime continues to
exist at all. The roles of the LSA and its advisory commission are
both set by statute. So are all of the substantive criteria.169 Thus,
the legislature could repeal both the rules and the structure at any
point, if its members were primarily interested in pursuing narrow
self-interest in a fashion unregulated by the Iowa Constitution or
federal law. It has not done so, even when the process produces
districts pairing, and thus threatening, incumbent legislators.170
165. Id. § 42.3(1)(a).
166. Id. § 42.3(2).
167. Id. § 42.3(3).
168. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 530 n.33.
169. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 2A.1, 42.4, 42.6 (West 2013).
170. One explanation for the restraint is that the Iowa state government has been
politically divided, with the governor and either the state senate or state house leadership
representing differing parties, in the redistricting years 1991, 2001, and 2011. History and
the Constitution, 74 IOWA OFFICIAL REG. 337, 356, 361, 364-65 (2011-2012), available at
http://www.legis.iowa.gov/Docs/Resources/Register/Chapter_7_History_and_Constitution.pdf.
Yet Iowa saw unified partisan government from 1997-1998 and 2007-2010—and still the
LSA structure remains in place. Even more intriguing, the governor’s mansion and
statehouse were controlled uniformly by Republicans in 1980, when the special redistricting
procedure was first implemented. See IOWA CANDIDATES FOR GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER
7, 1978, available at http://sos.iowa.gov/elections/pdf/results/70s/1978gencands.pdf; STATE OF
IOWA, CANVASS OF THE VOTE, GENERAL ELECTION: NOVEMBER 7, 1978, at 10-11, available at
http://sos.iowa.gov/elections/pdf/results/70s/1978gencanv.pdf. It is understandable that the
legislature would seek to avoid the extended court battles of the decade before, see In re
Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 196 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1972) (per curiam); In re
Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1972); In re Legislative
Districting of Gen. Assembly, 175 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 1970); Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 142
N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1966), but it is remarkable that the legislature ceded its own primary
redistricting role in order to do so. 
Finally, even in the redistricting years with divided government, the legislature could
easily have repealed the LSA structure, or taken control of the map in the final round of
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For those unconvinced by the Iowa story, another redistricting
example is readily at hand. The impetus to redraw district lines
ostensibly follows the decennial census, as a means of complying
with the constitutional mandate of equal representation for
equivalent populations.171 But redrawing district lines can also help
a legislative majority more tightly tailor districts for maximum
partisan advantage.172 After the Supreme Court’s 2006 refusal in
LULAC v. Perry to locate constitutional harm in a mid-decade
redrawing of district lines that had already been brought into
conformity with equal population standards, it appears that federal
law places no restrictions on repeated redistricting.173 And though
there are some state constitutional limits, ten states—expressly or
by silence—allow re-redrawing of state legislative districts (for
congressional districts, thirty-three states with more than one
district do so), and ambiguous text may support the practice in an
additional twenty-one states for state legislative districts (for
congressional districts, five states with more than one district).174
That represents a striking opportunity for unified partisan govern-
ments to pursue repeated tribal partisanship. And yet, even after
LULAC, the vast majority of states with the legal possibility,
political opportunity, and partisan incentive to redraw district lines
chose not to do so.175
redistricting, in order to enact a bipartisan gerrymander focused purely on self-regarding
behavior. It did not do so, even in years like 2001, in which 64 of the 150 legislative
incumbents were forced by LSA maps to run against each other, move, or retire. LEGISLATIVE
SERVS. AGENCY, PROPOSED REDISTRICTING PLAN 23 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/DOCS/LSA/IntComHand/2011/IHEGC000.pdf.
171. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583-84 (1964).
172. See Grofman & King, supra note 103, at 25.
173. 548 U.S. 399, 416-23 (2006). LULAC concerned the Texas legislature’s decision to
redraw lines previously drawn by a court, rather than a legislature; it is possible that the
Court would more readily find fault with legislative adjustment of a legislature’s valid lines.
Still, the Court’s decision turned on the out-party plaintiffs’ inability to prove a con-
stitutionally suspect effect. See id. It is likely that the same proof-of-harm problems—at least
under the Court’s current partisan gerrymandering doctrine—would present difficulties for
any mid-decade re-redistricting claim. 
174. Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” out of Redistricting: State
Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1258-66, 1280-85 (2007);
see ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(23); N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
175. From 2007-2010, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah had unified partisan government and
plausible state constitutional permission to redraw state legislative lines. In 2007, Louisiana
had similar opportunity, and in 2009 and 2010, Delaware joined the list. 
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The authority of each congressional chamber to judge the
legitimacy of elections to its own seats provides another example.
The Constitution delegates sole and unconditional power to each
House of Congress to determine the “Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members.”176 Even absent a nominally
credible challenge, there is no justiciable rule precluding a partisan
majority of the House of Representatives from simply unseating
opposition winners, and the structure of the House is certainly
designed to promote majoritarian action. There were 601 contested
election cases in the House from 1789-2002.177 Binding rules and
structure alone would suggest that 601 cases should favor the
majority party’s claimant. Indeed, rules and structure alone would
suggest that there would be far more than 600 cases in two
centuries, because a losing candidate from the majority party would
have little to lose by bringing a challenge. Yet in fact, only 50.2
percent of the decisions favored the majority party candidate.178
Remove the 262 contested cases between the Civil War and the turn
of the century—when a large number of contested cases were based
on disenfranchisement of African Americans in the South, and
resolved by Republican Congresses to favor Republican contestants
and by Democratic Congresses to favor Democratic contes-
tants—and the majority party wins decisively less than half of all
contested cases.179
And yet, only Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas conducted late-decade redistricting; only
Georgia did so without the need to replace maps struck by courts. Levitt, supra note 157,
at http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-GA.php (state senate); id. at http://redistricting.lls.edu/
states-NC.php (state legislature); id. at http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-TX.php (Congress).
Analysis compiled from data at Levitt, supra note 157; Levitt & McDonald, supra note 174;
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Composition of State Legislatures, by Political Party Affiliation tbl.419
(2011), available at http://1.usa.gov/YuHLR6; 2007 Partisan Composition by State, THE GREEN
PAPERS, http://thegreenpapers.com/G07/composition.phtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (listing
gubernatorial political affiliation); 2008 Partisan Composition by State, THE GREEN PAPERS,
http://thegreenpapers.com/G08/composition.phtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (same); 2009
Partisan Composition by State, THE GREEN PAPERS, http://thegreenpapers.com/G09/
composition.phtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (same); 2010 Partisan Composition by State, THE
GREEN PAPERS, http://thegreenpapers.com/G10/composition.phtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2014)
(same).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
177. Jeffery A. Jenkins, Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the House of
Representatives, 1789-2002, 18 STUD. AMER. POL. DEV. 112, 115 (2004).
178. Id. at 120.
179. Id. at 128-32.
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Much of the time, redistricting is an object lesson in the various
forms of partisanship. And a House vote on a contested election
presents unquestionable tribal partisan temptation. But even as
legislators undertake electoral regulation with tribal partisanship
in some ways, they forego tempting opportunities to pursue others.
And not all legislators pursue tribal partisanship in electoral
regulation, or do so to the same degree. Rules and structure are
insufficient to explain the variation.
One possible explanation for officials’ failure to capitalize on the
opportunities for tribal partisanship permitted by rules and
structure is cost. Partisan acts—particularly acts of tribal
partisanship—are not cost-free. Even assuming that the immediate
electoral benefit of tribal partisanship exceeds its immediate
electoral cost,180 there may still be opportunity costs in terms of
officials’ time and energy, litigation risk, and damage to a future
policy-making agenda. The repeated re-redistricting scenario above
provides an example. When the Texas legislature attempted to
redraw already valid lines in 2003, minority party legislators twice
fled the state to deprive the majority of a quorum; the aftermath of
the effort led to three additional years of litigation and destroyed
whatever minimal possibility of cross-aisle cooperation theretofore
existed.181
Another form of cost may relate to the iterative nature of
government action. Tribal partisanship in the electoral arena is
often aimed at perpetuating control by an existing slate of partisan
incumbents. But if a contemplated act of tribal partisanship is
insufficient to lock in that control (or if local officials cannot prevent
statewide shifts in partisan control, or state officials cannot prevent
national shifts in partisan control), opposing partisans may exact
payback in the future.182 Officials who question whether their
180. See supra text accompanying note 74.
181. Michael J. Kasper, The Almost Rise and Not Quite Fall of the Political Gerrymander,
27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 409, 421-22 (2007) (describing the tactic); see also Michael S. Kang, The
Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 465-67 (2005)
(surveying Texas state officials’ distaste for re-redrawing district lines because of the
distraction and difficulty in passing a second plan). See generally STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES
IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY
(2007) (recounting the Texas experience).
182. The analogies of “payback” and “retribution” are at best imperfect in this context.
Some tribal partisanship in the electoral arena may be aimed directly at fellow officials in
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favored measures will secure indefinite control may fear retribution
enough to maintain a rough détente, foregoing tribal partisanship
while in power in exchange for an implicit agreement that opposing
partisans will forego tribal partisanship should they gain control.183
Public response to tribal partisanship, and its impact on personal
ambition, may provide still a third form of cost. Officials seeking to
pursue higher office may conclude that the electoral gains from
tribal partisanship within a smaller jurisdiction do not sufficiently
compensate for political backlash in a larger area. Local election
administrators looking toward future campaigns, for example, may
choose to forego tribal partisanship if they believe that the local
gains will be outweighed by potential statewide backlash.184
That is, some officials with the potential to engage in tribal
partisanship will simply calculate that the benefit is not worth the
cost. And yet, instrumental cost-benefit analysis as the sole
remaining constraint on responsive and tribal partisanship seems
an impoverished theoretical backstop. Even when substantive rules
and institutional structure would otherwise permit partisanship,
there remain uncaptured partisan opportunities in which tangible
benefits to self or team would seem to exceed tangible costs. And
even when costs are substantial, it does not appear that cost-benefit
analysis based on tangible outcomes is actually motivating all actors
who refrain. Legislators, perhaps. Maybe some election officials
ways readily susceptible to retribution: when redistricting maps are designed to excise an
opposing legislator from “his” district, a switch in partisan control may well leave the
architect of such a plan excised from “his” own district in the next cycle. But other examples
do not suggest similarly parallel tit-for-tat opportunities. If a judge decides a close election
contest based on tribal partisanship or a prosecutor brings a particular case based on tribal
partisanship, opportunities for direct payback may be substantially less straightforward.
183. Cf. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (rev. ed. 2006) (discussing the
potential for cooperation in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma game known to be iterative).
It is important to emphasize that the incentive for restraint caused by a potential shift in
partisan control depends on the possibility of a shift in partisan control. An annual partisan
re-redistricting, for example, should substantially blunt the pragmatic possibility of a shift
in partisan control—and so it would be difficult to explain the absence of annual partisan re-
redistricting if the only motivation were fear of reprisal.
184. This is not to suggest that all such calculations will counsel against tribal
partisanship. It may well be that tribal partisanship in local office is sufficiently valued by
party leadership that it increases a local official’s support from the party for a future run for
higher office, and that the value of this party support—endorsements, volunteers, fundraising,
and an eased path through a primary—exceeds any backlash from the electorate.
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(though I remain skeptical). But FEC commissioners? Prosecutors?
Judges? Juries?
D. Role Morality and Situational Norms
I suggest that an underrecognized—and perhaps more power-
ful—explanation for the observed absence of partisanship when it
might otherwise be expected is a phenomenon sometimes called
“situational ethics” and sometimes “role morality.” It is the notion
that contextual norms matter and engender contextual behavioral
responsibilities, sometimes dependent on occupation or professional
role.185 Norms are generally supported by social approval for
conformity or sanction for misbehavior, and so reproof for violating
these contextual norms might well be considered still another cost
of partisanship like the costs surveyed above: a reputational cost (or
foregone opportunity for reputational benefit).186 And departure
from a deeply internalized norm might well involve a “guilt cost”187
to one’s self-perception: that is, the mindset that “no matter what
others think, X is not the sort of thing that I do.” Yet these costs are
different in kind from the costs discussed previously. Social reproof
or cognitive dissonance with one’s self-image need not be consciously
anticipated or recognized in order to be feared or avoided.188
Situational ethics are distinct—and distinctly powerful—levers of
behavior.
185. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1663-64 (1996).
186. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 366-72 (1997).
187. See Cooter, supra note 185, at 1662. Professor McAdams distinguishes this
internalized cost from an externalized cost by describing the former as “guilt” and the latter
as “shame.” See McAdams, supra note 186, at 380. Psychologists tend to define the terms a
bit differently: “guilt” refers to costs (whether self-imposed or socially imposed) for particular
behaviors, and “shame” refers to costs (whether self-imposed or socially imposed) concerning
evaluations of the self not confined to a particular event or action. That is, guilt may be
encapsulated by a feeling that “I did that horrible thing” (which was a bad thing to do) and
shame by a feeling that “I did that horrible thing” (and therefore I am a bad person). See June
Price Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345, 348-49
(2007).
188. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253,
1259-60 (1999) (recognizing that traditional conscious cost-benefit analysis is insufficient to
explain some compliance with moral norms).
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Role morality is among the most familiar of principles for
attorneys, each of whom swears to abide by a distinct code of
professional ethics that only rarely governs her conduct as a parent,
child, friend, patient, customer, investor, sports competitor, or actor
in hundreds of other roles.189 And recognition of the special ethical
demands on public officials generally is similarly widespread.190 But
the role of situational ethics in tempering partisanship in the public
sphere, particularly in the regulation of electoral processes, is
underappreciated.191 Indeed, even if the protections that norms
provide are not ironclad, they may be the most powerful means to
confront unwelcome forms of partisan intent.
Situational ethics yields the expectation that, under the right
circumstances, individuals with intense partisan preferences will
forego disfavored forms of partisanship: they will act in distinctly
“nonpartisan” ways in certain roles, even without “being” nonparti-
san, and even without the rules-based and structural constraints
discussed above. Examples abound.192 Consider a judge with a deep
personal affection for the Republican party. She may vote a straight
ticket for Republican candidates. She may even give the maximum
permissible campaign contribution to those candidates from her
personal funds. But even if the judge were selected in a partisan
election, it would be shocking to imagine that judge consciously
189. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013). Most of the rules that may
limit a lawyer’s conduct in other roles pertain to potential conflicts with a professional client
or conduct undertaken on a client’s behalf, not limits inherent in the nature of the alternative
role. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8, 1.9, 4.1, 4.4. One of the rare exceptions is Rule 8.4(c), providing that
it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation,” no matter the context. Id. R. 8.4(c).
190. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (2000) (“It is an
uncontroversial proposition in mainstream American legal thought that government lawyers
have greater responsibilities to pursue the common good or the public interest than their
counterparts in private practice, who represent non-governmental persons and entities.”).
191. In this vein, I agree entirely with Professor Heather Gerken in her call to develop and
enhance professional norms among election administrators. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE
DEMOCRACY INDEX 88-89 (2009). But though, as she suggests, particular performance norms
and metrics may well be “largely absent in the elections arena,” id. at 88, I suggest below that
the norm against tribal partisanship may actually be widespread, even if undercultivated.
192. The examples below are drawn from the United States, though of course the concept
is not distinctly American. For an exploration of how the Speaker of the Canadian House of
Commons may maintain both private partisan preference and a role-based abdication of tribal
partisanship, see, for example, Dale Lovick, Impartial but Not Non-Partisan: Re-Examining
the Mythology of the Speakership, CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REV., Winter 1996/97, at 4-6.
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deciding to rule for or against a litigant based purely on that
litigant’s partisan affiliation, in an election case or otherwise.193
Indeed, it would be exceedingly unusual to find that judge willing
to rule on a case based purely on the expressed preferences of most
Republican voters in the jurisdiction, without any personal jurispru-
dential preference for the underlying legal principle.194 This is
because the ethics of the judicial role—specific situational ethics,
inapplicable to those who are not judges and inapplicable to judges
when acting in a different capacity (for example, as a voter)—
preclude acting with tribal or responsive partisan intent.
True, judicial officials are bound by an ethical code with substan-
tial theoretical teeth. The ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, for
example, states that “[a] judge shall not permit ... political ...
interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or
judgment,”195 and stresses that:
193. The unlikely hypothetical is distinct from the observation that a judge’s party
affiliation (which, in appointed judiciaries, is usually assumed to be the party affiliation of the
appointing entity) may sometimes be correlated with the party affiliation of victorious
litigants. See, e.g., Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research:
Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413 (1995) (presenting one
study finding that federal judges are less likely to vote against redistricting plans drawn by
legislatures of “their” party than plans drawn by legislatures of an opposing party). The
existence of the correlation does not indicate the form of partisanship responsible for the
outcome.
194. That said, some research points toward a potential counterexample. There is robust
evidence that elected judges impose stricter criminal sentences, to a statistically significant
degree, toward the end of their term, as elections approach. See Carlos Berdejo & Noam
Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal
Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 741, 742 (2013). Unlike the simple partisan correlation
reviewed supra note 193, there are few explanations for this election-cycle timing effect
beyond responsiveness to the electorate. It is not clear whether the judges would themselves
recognize this fact. That is, it is not clear whether the judges are consciously modifying their
behavior in light of their perception of the electorate’s preferences or whether this is a pattern
fostered by subconscious beliefs. Cf. Kyle C. Kopko et al., In the Eye of the Beholder?
Motivated Reasoning in Disputed Elections, 33 POL. BEHAV. 271 (2011) (finding voting
patterns on hypothetical ballot challenges explicable only by either tribal partisanship or
unconscious partisan bias—albeit in an experimental setting unlikely to replicate the
rigorously maintained role morality of real-world judges).
195. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.4(B) (2011). As of 2014, at least nineteen states
had adopted language identical to the model rule; nine further states had similar language.
ABA Comm. on CPR Policy Implementation, Comparison of ABA Model Judicial Code and
State Variations, Rule 2.4, at 1 (2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2_4.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Even when subject to public election, a judge plays a role
different from that of a legislator or executive branch official.
Rather than making decisions based upon the expressed views
or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes decisions based
upon the law and the facts of every case. Therefore, in further-
ance of this interest, judges and judicial candidates must, to the
greatest extent possible, be free and appear to be free from
political influence and political pressure.196
In theory, at least, where states incorporate the ABA’s Model
Rules, judges who violate these ethical obligations may be not only
stripped of their judicial positions, but disbarred.197
Other public officials abide by similar ethical constraints on
election-related tribal partisanship, with similarly severe conse-
quences. Most officials in the federal executive branch, for example,
may not undertake any “activity directed toward the success or
failure of a political party, candidate for partisan political office, or
partisan political group” while on duty or otherwise using the
trappings of federal authority.198 Similar prohibitions apply to state
and local officials employed in connection with any activity receiving
federal appropriations.199 Violations may subject offenders not only
to removal200 but also to criminal sanctions.201
196. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1. As of 2014, at least twenty states had
adopted language similar to the comment in the model rule. ABA Comm. on CPR Policy
Implementation, Comparison of ABA Model Judicial Code and State Variations, Rule 4.1, at
4-20 (2014), available at http:// www.americanbar.org /content /dam/aba /administrative/
professional_responsibility/4_1.authcheckdam.pdf.
197. See MODEL RULES FOR JUD. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT § 2, R. 6(2) & cmt. (2013)
(“Some misconduct is so serious that the respondent should not only be removed from judicial
office but also be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.”).
198. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2006); 5 C.F.R. § 734.101 (2013); see 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1) (stating
that an employee “may not use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering
with or affecting the result of an election”); 5 C.F.R. §§ 734.302(a), 734.407 (same); see also
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1973) (“It
seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the
Government, or those working for any of its agencies, ... are expected to enforce the law and
execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political
party or group or the members thereof.”).
199. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1502(a)(1).
200. Id. §§ 1505, 7326.
201. 18 U.S.C. § 595 (2006) (establishing criminal penalties for federal employees, or state
employees engaged in activity receiving federal funds, for the use of “official authority for the
purpose of interfering with, or affecting, the nomination or the election of any candidate” for
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Situational ethics confronting partisanship may also be enforced
by legal mechanisms beyond direct employment-related or criminal
consequences. For example, a recent Florida ballot initiative codified
an ethical prohibition on tribal partisanship in redistricting: “No
apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent....”202
This law regulates partisan intent, not partisan effect. Indeed, by
directly aiming at the intent of the policymaker, it is best seen as a
binding norm of situational ethics.203 It is enforced not by sanctions
on individual policymakers engaging in partisanship but by judicial
review of the redistricting plans that result. That said, norms take
time to develop, and this particular norm may not yet have sunk in
in Florida. In its first review of a redistricting plan since the
prohibition on tribal partisanship went into effect, the Florida
Supreme Court struck a state plan because it found that those
drawing the lines failed to live up to their new ethical require-
ment.204
federal office).
202. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20(a), 21(a). At least six other states have similar laws or
policies. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(e) (“Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose
of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.”);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1506(8) (West 2013) (“Counties shall not be divided to protect a
particular political party or a particular incumbent.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(5) (West 2013)
(“No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator
or member of Congress, or other person or group.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 188.010(2) (West
2013) (“No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring any political party, incumbent
legislator or other person.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(5) (West 2013) (“The
commission’s plan shall not be drawn purposefully to favor or discriminate against any
political party or group.”); Leg. Res. 102, 102d Leg., 1st Sess., at ¶ 5 (Neb. 2011), available at
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=13489 (“District boundaries
shall not be established with the intention of favoring a political party or any other group or
person.”).
Montana statutes purport to have a similar law, which at least expresses the norm. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 5-1-115(3) (West 2013) (“A district may not be drawn for the purposes of favoring
a political party or an incumbent legislator or member of congress.”). However, in 2004,
related statutes were found to unlawfully limit the authority of the redistricting body under
the state constitution; it is possible that the limitation is therefore no longer legally binding.
Wheat v. Brown, 85 P.3d 765, 771 (Mont. 2004); Brown v. Mont. Districting & Apportionment
Comm’n, Case No. ADV 2003-72 (Mont. Dist. Ct. July 2, 2003), available at http://leg.mt.gov/
content/committees/interim/2003_2004/dist_apport/work_plan/BrownvMontanaDistricting.
pdf.
203. See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597,
617, 643 (Fla. 2012).
204. Id. at 615-19 (discussing the standard); id. at 654, 657-62, 669-79 (applying the
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The examples above show that situational ethical norms may
limit the forms of partisanship at which they are aimed, at least
when there is the realistic prospect of legal enforcement by an
external body.205 But though likely legal enforcement may be
sufficient to support strong ethical norms against partisanship, it is
not necessary. In other arenas, scholars have recognized the
immense power of norms to regulate behavior even without legal
sanction.206 Norms regarding partisanship are not inherently less
standard to strike down the redistricting plan for the Florida State Senate).
205. In some cases, the structure of an electoral institution may impact the realistic
prospect of legal enforcement. Although private individuals, nonprofit entities, and minor
parties may challenge electoral regulation, the major parties generally have more resources
to initiate (or support) litigation; this is particularly important when legal enforcement of a
norm related to partisanship requires extensive factual discovery. An institution with a
bipartisan structure fostering détente between the major parties may limit the likelihood that
one major party or the other would support litigation undoing any resulting compromise. That
reluctance, in turn, limits the likelihood that resources would be made available to enforce
existing legal provisions setting norms against partisanship.
This structural pattern may help to explain the apparent presence of tribal partisanship
in Washington State’s redistricting process, see Callaghan, supra note 133, despite a statute
providing that a redistricting plan “shall not be drawn purposely to favor or discriminate
against any political party or group.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(5) (West 2013). It
is possible that the statute might be interpreted to preclude only plan-wide tribal
partisanship, rather than tribal partisanship in the design of any single district. But to the
extent that the latter interpretation is more plausible, it may be that the norm does not face
a realistic prospect of enforcement in the event of a bipartisan gerrymander. If the
commissioners appointed by Republicans and those appointed by Democrats all engage in
tribal partisanship, and officials from their respective parties are relatively pleased with the
result, there will be little incentive for either party to provide funding for a suit.
Still, the fact that enforcement is less likely does not render it unthinkable. In this cycle,
a pro se petitioner did in fact file suit against the Washington plan (though he passed away
before litigation was complete). Petition for Declaratory Judgment, In re 2012 Wash. State
Redistricting Plan, Case No. 86976-6 (Wash. Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://redistricting.
lls.edu/files/WA%20milem%2020120208%20petition.pdf. Also in this cycle, lawsuits were filed
against redistricting plans drawn by bipartisan or multipartisan institutions in California,
Idaho, and Montana, all of which have legal provisions restraining tribal partisanship. See
Radanovich v. Bowen, Case No. 2:11-cv-09786 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/CA%20radanovich%2020120209%20order.pdf; Radanovich v.
Bowen, Case No. S196852 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.
gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_102011/handouts_20111026_csc.pdf; Order, Vandermost
v. Bowen, Case No. S196493 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://wedraw
thelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_102011/handouts_20111026_csc.pdf; Twin Falls
Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n on Redistricting, 271 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Idaho 2012); Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Willems v. Montana, Case No. DV-13-C7 (Mont. 14th Jud.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 14, 2013). Only the Montana case, currently pending, alleged any violation of
legal prohibitions on tribal partisanship.
206. See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE xxi (1966) (“[I]n a
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powerful. For those with strong incentives to act in partisan fashion,
ethical norms against tribal partisanship that are stronger still may
govern behavior even in the absence of credible legal enforcement.
I recognize that this assertion may seem hopelessly naïve.
Nevertheless, it seems to describe the world in which we live.207
Many, and perhaps most, ethical norms against tribal partisanship
backed by ostensible legal sanctions are not capable of ready
enforcement. Prosecutors, for example, may not select individuals
to prosecute based on their partisan affiliation.208 But absent a
smoking-gun memorandum carefully describing the partisan basis
for a prosecution, the evidentiary hurdles to establish such a
disposition are immense, and perhaps insurmountable. It would be
exceedingly difficult for any criminal defendant to nullify the
prosecution—and even more difficult to gain sanctions against the
prosecutor outside of the instant criminal case—based on a violation
of this ethical rule.209 And there are few effect-based rules or
structures that meaningfully constrain prosecution based on tribal
partisan intent, particularly when such intent can be masked with
relative ease.210 Yet it does not seem wildly speculative to contend
reasonable stable system, patterns of behavior tend to coincide with patterns of expectations.
People usually do what they are expected to do.”); Eisenberg, supra note 188, at 1254 n.2
(cataloguing recent work on the power of social norms to regulate behavior).
207. Indeed, the Framers seem to have relied on the power of ethical norms—and social
sanction—to govern official behavior as well. Even as he recognized the salience of notable
departures from the pursuit of the public interest, James Madison remarked that the protest
they occasioned also served as evidence of their rarity. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note
42, at 320 (James Madison) (“[Excessive self-regarding behavior] is a common topic of
declamation against human nature; and it must be confessed that instances of it are but too
frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the universal and extreme
indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary
sentiment.”).
208. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (noting that “the First Amendment
prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including
criminal prosecutions,” for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights); United States v.
Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569 n.9 (3d Cir. 1979).
209. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-90 (1999)
(describing the extraordinary burden of proof involved in such cases); see also Van de Kamp
v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340-43 (2009) (reviewing absolute prosecutorial immunity with
respect to personal liability for actions “associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process”).
210. Any given prosecutor’s office may, of course, structure itself to include layers of review
for any given prosecution by persons with differing partisan affiliation. To the extent that
such structures exist, there is no evidence that they are standard features of prosecutorial
offices generally.
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that such prosecutions are rare.211 If that is indeed the case, the
cause must be an ethical norm sufficiently powerful that it governs
practice even in the absence of a reliable legal enforcement mecha-
nism. More simply: most prosecutors—including those elected in
partisan contests—tend to take quite seriously their situational
ethical obligation to avoid tribal partisanship in their professional
role, even without a real chance of getting caught. To the extent that
there is a legal prohibition against tribal partisanship, it is effective
not because it creates the fear of punishment but because it
specifically articulates, publicizes, and supports the relevant
norm.212 The norm, not the legal repercussion, is doing the real
work.
Other examples are stronger still, as they confirm the potential
power of an ethical norm that is not backed by any threat of legal
sanction, defeating the urge to indulge tribal partisanship with
enormous pragmatic political repercussions. Professor Ned Foley
recounts the object lesson of Samuel Randall, Democratic Speaker
of the House in 1877, and his conduct during the enormously
contentious dispute over the 1876 Hayes-Tilden election.213 Randall
was no stranger to apparent tribal partisanship.214 But on March 1,
1877, he refused to permit the only last-ditch legislative procedural
maneuver that could have denied Republican Rutherford B. Hayes
the presidency and led to Democrat Samuel Tilden’s inauguration.215
211. Even unconfirmed allegations of such prosecutions are notable for their rarity. See,
e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, Ex-Atty. Gen. Says Prosecutor Played Politics, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2007, at 10, available at 2007 WLNR 20871998; Adam Zagorin, More Allegations of
Misconduct in Alabama Governor Case, TIME, Nov. 14, 2008, available at http://content.time.
com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1858991,00.html.
212. See Eisenberg, supra note 188, at 1269-70; McAdams, supra note 186, at 397-400; see
also M. Mindy Moretti, Doing a Nonpartisan Job in a Hyper-Partisan World, ELECTIONLINE
WEEKLY (Feb. 9, 2012), http://electionline.org/index.php/2012/726-electionlineweekly-february-
9-2012 (“Delaware law requires that I as well as my staff and all of the Elections employees
in the three county offices be non-partisan.... Having this law as a backdrop is a constant
reminder to us as well as to the politicians we interact with that we remain non-partisan.”)
(quoting Delaware commissioner of elections Elaine Manlove).
213. Edward B. Foley, Virtue over Party: Samuel Randall’s Electoral Heroism and Its
Continuing Importance (Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 189, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2210388.
214. Id. at 6-7.
215. The procedural dispute itself is considerably complex, even to summarize: it involved
the refusal to delay consideration of the validity of a certificate of electoral votes from
Vermont. Doing so might have delayed the electoral count sufficiently to yield no majority of
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That is, with no legal sanction whatsoever governing his behavior,
Randall refused to pursue tribal partisanship, even at the cost of
denying his party’s candidate the presidency.
Iowa’s redistricting process provides a more modern, if less
extreme, example. In addition to the rules and structural provisions
discussed above,216 ethical norms subject to enforceable legal
sanction at first appear to govern the process. The ministerial body
at the heart of the process comprises civil servants prohibited by law
from “participat[ing] in partisan political activities.”217 And an
overriding ethical norm governs both the commission advising the
LSA and the legislature’s role in modifying LSA plans: “No district
shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incum-
bent legislator or member of Congress, or other person or group.”218
But as discussed above, both of these norms exist at the whim of
the legislature. The legislature could repeal this statutory structure
at any point without legal sanction, to pursue tribal partisanship in
the redistricting process that is unregulated by the Iowa Constitu-
tion or federal law. It has not done so. There is some dispute about
the extent to which Iowa districts are actually drawn for the
purpose of favoring incumbents, despite the current statutory
scheme.219 But to the extent that the current process lives up to the
state electors by a designated date, allowing the Democratic House of Representatives to vote
unilaterally on the President. Id. at 9-19.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 160-64.
217. IOWA CODE ANN. § 2A.1(4) (West 2013). It is unclear whether this prohibition is meant
to define the full scope of the agency’s nonpartisanship, or whether it amounts to an
additional restriction. Moreover, “partisan political activities” are not further defined in Iowa
law. Federal law defines the term, for purposes of restrictions on federal executive personnel,
to essentially preclude tribal partisanship: “[p]olitical activity means an activity directed
toward the success or failure of a political party, candidate for partisan political office, or
partisan political group.” 5 C.F.R. § 734.101 (2013).
218. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(5) (West 2013).
219. Cf. Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform Since
Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES 6, 27 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005) (“According
to Congressional Quarterly Weekly, when Republicans controlled the [Iowa] state government
in 1981, the legislature approved a map on the third attempt, after rejecting two previous
maps that would have had a negative impact on the reelection of two incumbent
Republicans.”); Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform: What Is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY
LINES, supra, at 102 (“[I]n 1981, when Republican leaders complained that two of their House
incumbents were thrown together in a Democratic-leaning district, the ‘problem’ was
ameliorated in the second and ultimately successful third plan.”). The preceding quotes
strongly imply (but do not assert) tribal partisan intent on the part of those drawing the
maps.
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“nonpartisan” hype, the most compelling explanation is the notion
that the ethical norm against tribal partisanship has developed
sufficient strength to keep the existing rules in place even without
a legal mandate requiring its existence.
The strength of norms against tribal partisanship will vary from
institution to institution, as public actors are socialized by their
superiors and peers (and, to a lesser extent, their publics).220 But the
ethical limits on Iowa’s redistricting process are in a curious way
closer to the norm than the exception.221 Some redistricting is indeed
infused through-and-through with extremes of tribal partisan-
ship.222 But most electoral regulation is not. Serious ideological
partisanship persists in the construction and enforcement of election
laws, and serious ideological and responsive partisanship persists
in the creation of election legislation. By and large, however, the
Madison County experience, which surprises few cynical redistrict-
ing practitioners—“We are going to shove [the map] up your f------
a-- and you are going to like it, and I’ll f--- any Republican I
can”223—would still have the capacity to surprise in the campaign
finance or election administration context, or in the administrative
or judicial enforcement of existing redistricting laws. Salient exam-
ples of tribal partisanship in the regulation of the electoral process
persist, but they may be salient because of their comparative
220. Roger H. Davidson, Socialization and Ethics in Congress, in REPRESENTATION AND
RESPONSIBILITY: EXPLORING LEGISLATIVE ETHICS 109, 110-113 (Bruce Jennings & Daniel
Callahan eds., 1985).
221. Consider as well a North Carolina law stating that “all drafting and information
requests to legislative employees and documents prepared by legislative employees for
legislators concerning redistricting” by the state legislature become public records once a
redistricting plan is enacted. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 120-133 (West 2013). This is an
intriguing departure from the norm: in the federal legislature, and in many states, the
legislative activities of staff are privileged. See Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the
Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 251-53, 255-56, 265-70
(2003) (reviewing the federal model and a few limited state departures).
The North Carolina statute was enacted in 1983; the legislature could have repealed or
modified it at any point, but despite the enormously contentious redistricting battles of the
ensuing decades, it remains in place. It is difficult to justify this unusual assertion of
transparency based on the tribal self-interest of a legislature under unified partisan control.
Instead, the provision modestly increases the chance of public sanction for acts of tribal
partisanship—and as such, it becomes a wholly voluntary enforcement mechanism supporting
a norm against tribal partisanship in redistricting.
222. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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rarity.224 The ocean of decisions to forego tribal partisanship while
regulating elections, despite ample available opportunity to indulge
partisan impulses, does not make the front page of the papers.
That is, public officials with recognizable partisan affiliations can
leave behind private tribal partisan impulses when acting in a
public capacity, even when their self-interest is implicated. Indeed,
our lived experience is that they not only can but repeatedly do, in
daily official acts large and small, even when there are opportunities
to behave otherwise. Some groups of officials have firmer norms
against tribal partisanship than others, and these norms are
stronger in some circumstances than others. But even the weaker
end of the spectrum is stronger than conventional wisdom suggests.
The “voting wars”225 are intense, but they are not yet nuclear.
Imagine a world in which legislative majorities and administrators
had no constraints at all on the extent of their tribal partisan-
ship—a world in which most election-related decisions, minutiae
and sweeping initiatives alike, were undertaken by most officials for
tribal partisan reasons most of the time. It would look little like the
world we inhabit. The difference between that world and ours is
that situational ethics exist and have real power.
E. Maintaining Role Morality
Like all norms, situational norms and standards of role morality
are difficult to build and require substantial upkeep.226 Once a
224. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 134, at 1822 n.50 (noting that “[n]either the 1982 California
nor the 2002 Texas congressional redistricting”—both extremes of the partisan
gerrymandering genre—“are usual cases”). Allegations of tribal partisanship dogged a 2011
Florida law that, among other things, reduced early voting hours; the allegations were
themselves newsworthy. See Kam & Lantigua, supra note 80; cf. Justin Levitt, Election
Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97, 99-102 (2012)
(finding that the new law’s costs exceeded its recognizable public benefits). Notably, in
denying the allegations, the spokesman for the accused party did not defend tribal partisan
action, but confirmed that such partisanship would have violated role norms had it occurred.
Kam & Lantigua, supra note 80 (“ ‘If what [the former party chair] said had happened, that
would be wrong and he should have fired those men,’ [the current party spokesman] said.”).
225. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS (2012) (discussing current election
law controversies).
226. See William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 569 (1994)
(“In order to remain viable, even the most elementary and noncontroversial of norms require
reinforcement through regular social interactions.”).
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critical mass of actors adopts a regular norm, that social expectation
exerts a powerful influence on action by all in the relevant commu-
nity.227 But when norms are not consistently followed, and where
deviation from the recognized norms is either undetected or val-
idated rather than sanctioned, the norms will tend to lose their
power to influence behavior.228
Because social expectation defines norms, public commentary
plays a significant role in maintaining—or subverting—the strength
of these norms. Of the forms of partisanship, tribal partisanship is
the manifestation of partisanship most consistently normatively
denigrated, by scholars and the lay public alike. Curiously, this
social norm against tribal partisanship in official action may even
extend to the official’s own fellow partisans. Democrats may love it
when Democratic officials vigorously fight for ideologically aligned
principles, but even fellow Democrats tend to be leery of action
taken by Democratic officials purely for the private gain of particu-
lar Democratic partisans.229
Consistent reaction against official displays of tribal partisanship,
particularly in official action with respect to electoral regulation,
may help reinforce this apparent norm.230 However, this reaction
must be carefully calibrated in order to be effective—and in practice,
it is too infrequently carefully calibrated. Some of the imprecision
is due to the fact that it is difficult to sanction tribal partisanship if
it cannot be reliably detected or diagnosed; that is, if tribal partisan-
ship cannot be reliably distinguished from coincidental, ideological,
227. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 185, at 1665; Eisenberg, supra note 188, at 1260-61, 1264-
65; McAdams, supra note 186, at 366-72 (discussing the feedback effect of behavioral
compliance with a shared value); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 61, supra note 42, at 343 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“There is a contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to
resist.”). See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (discussing the
development of behavioral norms even without legal sanction).
228. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 27-28 (2006); Eisenberg, supra
note 188, at 1288-91 (describing the collapse of a pre-existing norm); Jones, supra note 226,
at 567-68; McAdams, supra note 186, at 368.
229. See supra notes 71-72.
230. It is unclear whether, or to what degree, social strata make a difference here: whether
disapprobation from those perceived to be above one’s own social station, or from perceived
peers, or from perceived constituents, or from a broader lay audience is any more or less
impactful. I suspect that approbation or disapprobation by perceived superiors and perceived
peers is most powerful as a driver of behavior, but that is an empirical hypothesis subject to
testing.
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or responsive partisanship, it is difficult to target it effectively for
disapproval.231
But not all of the lost opportunity to reinforce the norm against
tribal partisanship is based on accurate detection. For example,
some jaded observers simply shrug at tribal partisanship when it is
admitted, behind the scenes or in public. Refusing to condemn tribal
partisanship when it does occur is not merely a neutral omission.
Norms hold their power as effective social regulatory mechanisms,
in part, because actors fear social sanction for violating the norm,
when (and only when) they violate the norm.232 In a society that
prizes weekly tithing at church, it may be known that he who
publicly fails to contribute to the collection basket will receive
negative social feedback: glares, mutters, an indignant lecture.
Consistent negative feedback (or withholding of positive feedback)
for those who fail to contribute reinforces the norm. In contrast, if
a shirker receives no sanction—or worse, approval—the church
should expect more shirkers in subsequent weeks. Mistargeted
public approval of tribal partisanship, or at least decisions to refrain
from sanctioning it, are likely to weaken the norm.233
The answer, however, is not merely more public rancor whenever
partisanship is alleged or uncertain. Mistargeted public disapproval
may weaken the norm as well. Consider an individual who tithes,
but receives the same neighborly glare as a shirker. When the
individual repeatedly receives that same feedback despite contribut-
ing to the collection basket, he learns that abiding by the norm does
not prevent the disfavored feedback. With no way to avoid the social
sanction usually associated with disobeying the norm, the norm
231. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation, Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 982 (2005) (“It is,
of course, impossible to know in most instances the extent to which a discretionary decision
made by a partisan elections official can best be explained by partisan bias rather than a
reasoned decision on an issue on the merits.”); Tokaji, supra note 66, at 437 (“I do not deny
the difficult problem ... of disentangling partisan motivations from ideological ones.”); cf.
McAdams, supra note 186, at 361 (noting that there must be “an inherent risk that anyone
who engages in the behavior at issue will be detected”).
232. See McAdams, supra note 186, at 352 (“A norm exists as long as the sanctions imposed
on violators create an expected cost for noncompliance that exceeds the expected cost of
compliance.”).
233. See Patrick J. Keenan, Do Norms Still Matter? The Corrosive Effects of Globalization
on the Vitality of Norms, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 327, 367, 369 (2008).
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quickly loses its force. Glare at a tither often enough, and he will not
feel the need to tithe in order to avoid an unwelcome glare.
So too with partisanship. Public officials with control of the
electoral reins may forego tribal partisanship in their official
capacities because of a deeply held situational norm. If they stray
into tribal partisanship and are castigated for the deviation by
people whose opinions they prize, the norm will be reinforced. If
they stray into tribal partisanship without such castigation,
however, the norm may lose some of its conditioning force. And the
reverse—which may be more frequent in the modern media
environment—is also true. If public officials receive the same
castigation as tribal partisans when they have not acted with tribal
partisanship—when, perhaps, partisanship resulting from their
actions has been coincidental or ideological or responsive (or
nonexistent)—the norm may be similarly degraded.234 Alleging
tribal partisanship where none exists simply decreases the power of
the social sanction for tribal partisanship when it does exist.235
234. The most straightforward form of castigation is an angry accusation that an official
has engaged in improper tribal partisanship. But unwarranted speculation—“Has official X
engaged in improper tribal partisanship?” or “There are questions about whether official X
has engaged in improper tribal partisanship” or “We cannot discount the possibility that
official X engaged in improper tribal partisanship”—may have much the same effect.
Observers—and more importantly, the relevant officials themselves—will more naturally tend
to perceive the linkage to improper tribal partisanship as an accusation than as a statement
or question with neutral valence. That is, wondering aloud whether a particular act is the
product of tribal partisanship, without sufficient evidence to support the idea, is likely to have
the same impact as an unwarranted allegation of impropriety. Cf. EDW Lynch, Twitterbot
‘The Answer Is No’ Responds ‘No’ to Questions Posed by Headlines, LAUGHING SQUID (May 7,
2013, 4:58 PM), http://laughingsquid.com/twitterbot-the-answer-is-no-responds-no-to-
questions-posed-by-headlines/ (describing a Twitter feed automatically answering “No” to
news headlines that end in a question mark, to bring attention to the perceived equivalence
between speculative questions and assertions).
235. Allegations of partisanship based purely on past activities or affiliations are likely to
have the same effect. Role morality may well cause the same individual to act quite differently
as a voter, a contributor, a party employee, a nonprofit activist, an attorney, a prosecutor, and
a legislative candidate. But some observers show a disturbing predilection to assume that this
role morality does not exist: to assume that an individual will engage in similar forms of
partisanship in dissimilar roles. See Tony Mauro, Is Ted Olson Too Partisan to Run Justice?,
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at 12; Robert McCartney, Fairfax Democrats Worry GOP May
Taint Vote Process, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2012, at B1, available at 2012 WLNR 22078819;
‘Every Single One’: PJ Media’s Investigation of Justice Department Hiring Practices, PJ
MEDIA, http://pjmedia.com/every-single-one-pj-medias-investigation-of-justice-department-
hiring-practices/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). Simple assertions or insinuations that individuals
will engage in tribal partisanship in a new role, based solely on the partisan nature of activity
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Consider an official with private partisan preferences who foregoes
tribal partisanship in accord with the prevailing situational norm.
Glare at her long enough based on misplaced allegations of tribal
partisan behavior, and she will not feel the need to refrain in order
to avoid an unwelcome glare.236
I want to be clear: norms are group phenomena, created by
repeated stimuli and undermined by repeated stimuli, with stimuli
from some actors more meaningful than stimuli from others. Few
public officials are likely to change their behavior based on isolated
unwarranted slurs from sources with no personal relationship. But
groups are merely collections of individuals, and we are all capable
of contributing in various degrees to the strength or weakness of a
situational norm. Moreover, to the extent—and it may be quite a
limited extent—that public officials give substantial weight to the
opinion of scholarly commentators in assessing social approval or
sanction,237 the scholarly community has particular responsibility
undertaken while wearing a distinct prior “hat,” fail to recognize that people can and do
behave differently in different roles. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 185-88. If the
new role involves norms against tribal partisanship, and the individual refrains from tribal
partisanship but nevertheless draws social sanction, the critique may well undermine the
norms of the new role. That is, unwarranted critique that an individual is acting in tribally
partisan fashion may undermine norms against tribal partisanship, fostering the possibility
of the very tribal partisanship that the critics find objectionable.
236. Misplaced allegations of tribal partisanship in electoral regulation also have effects
beyond the erosion of norms against such partisan activity. Electoral regulations purport to
establish a legitimate process by which we select representatives to resolve vigorously
contested substantive issues. Citizens will inevitably disagree about the wisdom of the
electoral regulations as well. But describing electoral regulations as the product of tribal
partisanship when they are not so motivated brands the regulations as not merely suboptimal
but illegitimate. This is a difference in kind. And to the extent that illegitimate electoral
regulations are material to the election of particular candidates, those representatives and
all of their public actions also labor under a cloud of illegitimacy. Government by consent of
the governed cannot long survive when the conditions for allotting representation are widely
perceived as fundamentally illegitimate. Or, as Professor Chris Elmendorf phrased the point,
“there may be a duty to avoid hyperbole in the domain of election-law lawmaking that does
not extend to other areas.” E-mail from Christopher S. Elmendorf, Professor of Law, U.C.
Davis School of Law, to Justin Levitt, Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School (Oct. 31,
2013, 10:27 AM) (on file with author).
237. It is clear that “high-status individuals will have relatively more influence on the
creation of new norms” and on the maintenance or dissolution of existing ones. McAdams,
supra note 186, at 416. Whether public officials view scholarly commentators as “high-status
individuals” is an entirely different question.
1858 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1787
to ensure that musings about partisanship do not unwittingly
encourage the weakening of preferred norms.238
A recent piece by Professor Ellen Katz shows the need for
increased vigilance in this regard—and the value of disaggregating
the spectrum of partisanship. Professor Katz, whom I respect and
admire, presented a challenging thought piece in the Stanford Law
and Policy Review, advocating for the unrecognized benefits of
Department of Justice (DOJ) action against opposing partisan
actors in the preclearance process required by the Voting Rights Act
(VRA).239 This process represents a federal regime unique in the
legislative toolbox: No jurisdiction within selected geographies240
238. SCOTUSblog’s revered reporter Lyle Denniston deserves special commendation in this
regard. In reporting on judicial decisions, he has conscientiously refrained from referring to
the party affiliation of presidents appointing the judges, to avoid the strong implication of
responsive or tribal partisanship where none is warranted. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston,
Michigan Affirmative Action Ban Nullified, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 15, 2012, 3:23 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/11/michigan-affirmative-action-ban-nullified/ (“Readers will
find, in some news accounts about this decision, references to the political party affiliation of
the Presidents who named the judges to the bench, referring to them as Republican or
Democratic appointees. The author of this blog will provide that information only when it is
clearly demonstrated that the political source of a judge’s selection had a direct bearing upon
how that judge voted — admittedly, a very difficult thing to prove. Otherwise, the use of such
references invites the reader to draw such a conclusion about partisan influence, without
proof.”).
239. Ellen D. Katz, Democrats at DOJ: Why Partisan Use of the Voting Rights Act Might
Not Be So Bad After All, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 415 (2012).
240. Before June 25, 2013, these geographies were largely determined by statutory
formula. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006). That formula, reauthorized by Congress in 2006,
was struck down by the Supreme Court as insufficiently tailored to present conditions. Shelby
Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627-29 (2013). In the absence of further congressional
action, the only jurisdictions required to preclear new election-related policies will be those
that have been individually subjected to the preclearance process by a federal court, known
generally as “bail in.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).
In the wake of Shelby County, far fewer jurisdictions will be subject to preclearance.
However, the preclearance structure still exists, and several jurisdictions are presently
subject to preclearance requirements under § 1973(c). See United States v. Vill. of Port
Chester, No. 06-cv-15173, ¶¶ 8-10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2009) (consent decree) (preclearance
requirement until 2016), available at http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/Port%20Chester%20
consent%20decree.pdf.; Blackmoon v. Charles Mix Cnty., No. 05-cv-04017, ¶ 2 (D.S.D. Dec.
4, 2007) (consent decree) (preclearance requirement until 2024), available at https://www.
aclu.org/files/pdfs/votingrights/blackmoon_v_charlesmixcounty_consent_decree.pdf; Allen v.
City of Evergreen, No. 13-cv-00107 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2014) (order) (preclearance requirement
until 2020), available at http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/Evergreen,%20Alabama%20order.pdf.
More jurisdictions may join them: since Shelby County, litigants have requested judicially
imposed preclearance requirements in at least six jurisdictions. See, e.g., Complaint at 22-23,
Terrebonne Parish Branch NAACP v. Jindal, No. 3:14-cv-00069 (M.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014)
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may implement a new election-related policy until the policy has
been approved either by the DOJ or by a federal court.241 Approval
is guided by distinct statutory standards developed through case
law and designed to ensure that new election policies betray neither
discriminatory effect nor discriminatory intent with respect to the
effective exercise of the franchise by racial and language
minorities.242 If the DOJ approves a policy pursuant to the statutory
standard, that decision is unreviewable; if, however, the DOJ
declines to give its approval, the jurisdiction in question may seek
a “second opinion” by the federal court.243
Professor Katz recognized, quite correctly, that preclearance
denials by the DOJ may provide a more public opportunity to review
and evaluate the proper role of race in the electoral process.244
Preclearance approvals are generally form letters, with little or no
explanation of the reasons for the decision, and though the DOJ
often seeks public input on policies subject to preclearance, that
input is rarely released for public view. Approvals, as mentioned
above, are unreviewable; legal deliberations on the substantive
preclearance standard begin and end, for approved submissions,
(Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana); Complaint at 20, Walker v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist., No.
1:13-cv-00728 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2013) (Beaumont Sch. Dist., Texas); Complaint at 17,
Petteway v. Galveston Cnty., No. 3:13-cv-00308 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2013) (Galveston County,
Texas); Complaint at 31, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, No. 1:13-cv-658
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2013) (North Carolina); Complaint at ¶ 27, Jackson v. Bd. of Trs. of Wolf
Point, Mont., Sch. Dist. No. 45-45A, No. 4:13-cv-00065-DLC-RKS (D. Mont. Aug. 7, 2013)
(Wolf Point Sch. Dist. No. 45-45A, Montana); Plaintiffs’ Joint Advisory to the Court on Issues
Relating to Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act at 7-8, 26, Perez v. Texas, No. 5:11-cv-00360-
OLG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. July 22, 2013) (Texas). And whatever the current prevalence of
preclearance, the preclearance structure and the argument of the Katz article mentioned in
the text nicely demonstrate the need to be precise in evaluating the merits of different forms
of partisanship.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). Before congressional reauthorization of the preclearance
“formula” was struck in Shelby County, the relevant court was most often a federal court in
Washington, D.C. Id. § 1973c. Now, the most relevant federal court supervising electoral
changes is the local federal court originally responsible for ordering judicial preclearance.
242. Id. § 1973c(b); see also Justin Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire: Citizen Commission
Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1041, 1060-67 (2013)
(elaborating the substantive standard).
243. A jurisdiction may also forego DOJ review entirely and proceed directly to federal
court seeking a declaratory judgment that the new policy should be precleared under the
statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a(c), 1973c(a).
244. See Katz, supra note 239, at 419, 422-23. Although I agree that there is great need for
a national conversation on racial justice in the electoral process, I am less sanguine that the
most appropriate or productive forum for such a conversation is adversarial litigation.
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with the form letter. In contrast, preclearance denials are usually
delivered with some explanatory rationale and may be pursued
further in court, with a far more public airing of the relevant claims,
the role of public officials, and the impact on minority electors in the
jurisdiction. These judicial preclearance actions also provide a rare
opportunity for authoritative judicial construction of the substantive
standards involved in preclearance.245
Professor Katz also noted the partisan effects of some preclear-
ance decisions: a Democratic DOJ’s decision to deny preclearance to
new electoral policies promulgated by Republican jurisdictions may
favor the Administration’s party, and a Republican DOJ’s decision
with respect to local Democrats’ policies may have similar effects.246
Such actions are often criticized as exercises in illegitimate
partisanship. But Katz wondered whether, given the opportunity
that such actions create for judicial grappling with the role of race
in the electoral process, “partisan use of the VRA by the DOJ (and,
indeed, other actors) is not the cause for concern it is often made out
to be and instead often has beneficial consequences.”247 After all, if
the DOJ’s legal position in a preclearance denial motivated by
partisanship is flawed, courts may have the opportunity to correct
the substantive error.
What this articulation elides are the distinctions in the spectrum
of partisanship that make all the difference. To the extent that a
Democratic DOJ denies preclearance to a Republican electoral
change (or vice versa) based solely on the straightforward applica-
tion of an unambiguous statutory standard—that is, to the extent
that coincidental partisanship is the cause—there is no normative
counterweight to whatever deliberative benefits result from the
denial. To the extent that the DOJ denies preclearance based on an
ideologically distinct understanding of ambiguous statutory text,
different from the understanding of a different DOJ under a
different administration, that is the natural byproduct of an
administrative structure designed to change from partisan election
to partisan election, and should similarly provide little normative
245. See Redistricting and the 2010 Census: Enforcing Section 5 of the VRA: Hearing Before
the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, at 9 (Feb. 3, 2012) (statement of Justin Levitt), available at
http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/USCCR%20testimony.pdf.
246. See Katz, supra note 239, at 417.
247. See id. at 418, 422-23.
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hesitation. But “partisan use” of the VRA driven by responsive or
tribal partisanship is neither contemplated nor benign. And
regardless of the deliberative benefits it may provoke, such activity
is likely to have substantial undesired ripple effects.248
The reason is role morality. The existing norm against tribal
partisanship is attached to the role of DOJ attorney. While wearing
that particular hat, individuals may not practice tribal partisanship,
particularly in the election process.249 If the norm were not only
eroded but reversed, such that tribal partisanship were condoned or
favored in certain factual scenarios, it is not clear whether the
mental category “reviewing preclearance submissions by opposing
partisans” would retain stable boundaries. It is not far-fetched to
imagine that DOJ attorneys would begin to allow tribal partisan-
ship to favor preclearance approvals for policies submitted by
officials of their own party, despite the fact that such approvals are
not subject to judicial review and do not provoke any positive
deliberative externality.250 Moreover, at a leadership level, the same
officials are involved in affirmative voting rights litigation well
beyond preclearance; tribal partisanship might predictably begin to
infect those other cases as well. Once it becomes acceptable to
practice tribal partisanship as a DOJ attorney in some circum-
stances, there is a serious concern that tribal partisanship would
drive decisions in other circumstances as well. The categorical
nature of role-based norms helps those who freely indulge tribal
partisanship “at home” to effectively turn off such instincts “at
work.” But that same property raises the risk of introducing tribal
partisanship, for some decisions but not others, into a role where it
was previously denigrated. Such partisanship may not be so easily
cabined.251
248. Of course, well beyond any beneficial effects on the development of the law of the VRA,
and beyond any negative effects based on role morality, there are plentiful additional concerns
with the use of DOJ authority based on tribal partisanship, including legal barriers, see 18
U.S.C. § 595 (2006), moral concerns (which may have contributed to criminalization of the
behavior), and concerns over the resources involved in forcing the preclearance process into
the courts.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
250. Professor Katz expressly acknowledges that such cases raise “distinct and more
troubling concerns,” Katz, supra note 239, at 417; my argument is that it may be quite
difficult to maintain a norm condoning tribal partisanship only against disfavored partisans
while prohibiting tribal partisanship with respect to others.
251. For this reason, I argue that tribal partisanship in the DOJ’s enforcement of voting
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Or perhaps it may. The concerns above ultimately resolve to
empirical questions about the ease with which boundaries between
roles become more or less permeable. The hypothesis set forth
herein is that role morality is “sticky” within private and public
spheres (for example, that individuals behave differently as voters
and contributors than they do while acting in a public capacity or
wielding public authority), and “sticky” within particular public
employment positions (for example, that individuals behave
differently as judges than they do as administrators or
legislators),252 but comparatively fluid across public functions or
subject matter areas within any given position (for example, that
administrators’ approach to campaign finance and election adminis-
rights should not be condoned, even theoretically. By the same token, it is dangerous to
lambaste DOJ actions as motivated by tribal partisanship when they are not, lest the norm
against tribal partisanship be eroded through unwarranted critique. See supra text
accompanying note 234. For example, recent actions by the DOJ to seek judicial preclearance
for Texas and to contest Texas’s new requirement for voters to show photo identification at
the polls prompted Senator John Cornyn to claim that “[f]acts mean little to a politicized
Justice Department bent on inserting itself into the sovereign affairs of Texas and a lame-
duck Administration trying to turn our state blue.” Holly Yeager, Justice Dept. Sues Texas
Over New Voter ID Measure, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2013, at A1, available at 2013 WLNR
20944092. If tribal partisanship is indeed motivating DOJ action, the stark rebuke is
warranted; if, as I suspect, other motivations are more plausibly responsible, the accusation
actually helps to undermine norms against tribal partisanship. 
252. But see Brannon P. Denning, The Case Against Appointing Politicians to the Supreme
Court, 64 FLA. L. REV. F. 31, 32 (2012) (speculating that “it might be difficult for a politician
cum Justice to shed party attachments even after donning her robes”).
In a different context, Professor James Sample presents the story of Justice Menis
Ketchum’s transition from judicial candidate to judge. James J. Sample, Lawyer, Candidate,
Beneficiary, AND Judge? Role Differentiation in Elected Judiciaries, 2011 U. CHI. L. F. 279,
281-83. The issue was precommitment rather than partisanship: as a candidate, Ketchum had
“flatly and categorically promised” not to vote, as a West Virginia Supreme Court Justice, to
overturn a state cap on punitive damage awards. Id. at 281. When the issue came before the
Court, Justice Ketchum refused to recuse himself, claiming that he had made his promises
in a different role; when his refusal to recuse was publicized, he maintained that there was
no legal basis for his recusal, but nevertheless reversed his earlier decision and disqualified
himself from the case. Id. at 282-83. Whatever the merits of the recusal decision itself, the
episode seems salient to the discussion of role morality above. First, Justice Ketchum
perceived (in my view, correctly) a distinction between the expectations for the conduct of a
candidate for office and the expectations for that same individual as an officeholder. Moreover,
when his conduct in office was publicized, he took immediate action to bring his conduct in
line with his perception of a shared public norm. He believed the action to be legally
unnecessary (and it was almost certainly insulated from binding legal reversal), but the
notion of public disapproval nevertheless brought his conduct in line with the socially
expected situational norm. Role morality can be a powerful behavioral impetus.
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tration is similar).253 The reason is that public and private spheres,
and different job titles, appear relatively clearly delineated, while
functions and subject-matter categories appear relatively less so.
But perhaps the bounds of these latter areas are actually fairly
stable as well. There are few reliable measures of such behavior,
but, for example, tribal partisanship seems far less prevalent among
legislators in most legislative arenas than in the redistricting
process, and less prevalent still in their approach to constituent
service.254
More empirical work on the boundaries of roles, and the condi-
tions under which they remain stable for purposes of situational
ethics, is warranted.255 It may be that officials who see nothing
wrong with engaging in tribal partisanship in one subject-matter
area will refrain from doing so in others, even while serving the
same function in the same articulated position. Still, without better
understanding of the circumstances in which norm boundaries
collapse, it seems dangerous to introduce or foster a disfavored form
of partisanship in an environment with strong existing normative
constraints. Once degraded, norms against disfavored forms of
partisanship may be quite difficult to repair.
253. Consider, for example, the hypothesis that situational norms are relatively sticky
across private/public spheres but relatively fluid across one position’s several functions. This
may offer one explanation for the fact that there are few calls for election officials to forego
voting or contributing privately to candidates they support, but plentiful calls for such officials
to forego public endorsements or fundraising solicitations for candidates’ campaigns. See, e.g.,
Ray Martinez III, Greater Impartiality in Election Administration: Prudent Steps Toward
Improving Voter Confidence, 5 ELECTION L.J. 235, 245-46 (2006). Particularly when such
recommendations extend even to officials elected in partisan contests, id., it is more plausible
that the proposed restraint responds more to concerns regarding officials’ actual conduct (and
the bleed of situational norms) than concerns regarding voter perception.
254. But see Butler & Broockman, supra note 48, at 469, 472 (finding that in practice,
legislators respond more readily to requests from constituents of the same party).
255. There are also intriguing empirical questions about the characteristics of individual
public officials that suggest different conclusions with respect to the efficacy of situational
norms. For example, some individuals are more guilt-prone than others, see Tangney et al.,
supra note 187, at 351, 354, which suggests that the costs of breaching role norms may be
higher for such individuals than others. It would be intriguing to test whether public officials,
or certain types of public officials, are meaningfully distinct from the general population in
the extent to which they are guilt-prone.
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CONCLUSION
Current thinking about partisanship is beset by imprecision that
leaves observers talking past each other. Partisanship is often
described as if it were uniform, when it in fact comprises a spectrum
of phenomena. We may sometimes seek to understand, dilute, or
foster the partisan effects of public policy. On other occasions, we
may instead seek to understand, dilute, or foster the undertaking of
public policy with partisan intent, whether coincidental, ideological,
responsive, or tribal. We cannot reliably affect the partisanship we
wish to affect without more precisely analyzing the part of the
partisanship spectrum we wish to influence.
In formulating the rules of the electoral process, partisanship
may have particularly pronounced consequences; that insight has
spurred various attempts to limit partisanship in its most perni-
cious manifestations. But here too, those who seek to combat
partisanship may misunderstand the scope—and limitations—of
their toolbox. In particular, given all of the attention to effect-based
rules and structural design, observers may be discounting not just
the value of role morality, but the substantial work that it presently
does and the threats to its continued vitality.
The most effective efforts to confront partisanship, of course, will
involve all three tools working in concert. Consider, as just one
example, California’s newly created redistricting commission.256 In
2008 and 2010, California voters passed two ballot initiatives ceding
control of state legislative and congressional redistricting to a
multipartisan257 commission of citizens not beholden to incumbent
elected officials;258 the commission drew districts for the first time
in 2011.
256. I do not present California’s commission as a Platonic ideal, either for confronting
partisanship or for achieving other objectives of the redistricting process. Instead, I offer it
merely as a prominent example of a policy tool relying on multiple tools in concert in order to
confront partisanship.
257. By statute, the commission comprised five individuals registered with the largest
political party, five registrants from the second-largest political party, and four individuals
not registered with either major party. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(2).
258. Id. § 2(c)(1); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(2) (West 2008).
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The commission was described as “nonpartisan”259 and as
deploying “nonpartisan” rules,260 and it was critiqued because it was
not, allegedly, “nonpartisan.”261 But of course, it was not designed to
be “nonpartisan” in every respect.262 In particular, it was not
designed to eliminate all partisan effects nor all partisan influences;
indeed, commissioners were, by design, selected in part based on
259. See, e.g., John S. Caragozian, From Crisis to Solution—California’s Problems in Two
Books: A Review of Remaking California and California Crackup, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 687,
691 (2011); Michael Barone, The Casualty List Long for Obama’s Victory, VALLEY TIMES-NEWS
(Lonett, Ala.), Nov. 16, 2012, at 6, available at 2012 WLNR 24495332; Steven Greenhut, More
Proof of Redistricting Manipulation, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 1, 2012, available at 2012
WLNR 44293.
260. See SEC’Y OF STATE OF CAL., CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE 137 (2008), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/pdf-
guide/vig-nov-2008-principal.pdf (Proposition 11 at § 2(d)). The notion of nonpartisan rules
suffers from the same ambiguity concerning the terms “partisanship” and “nonpartisanship”
lamented throughout this Article. To the extent that the notion implies that commission
districts would have zero partisan effect, it certainly promises too much. But in context, the
better explanation is that the description reflects the fact that the commission’s substantive
rules were not designed in order to produce partisan bias—unlike, say, the guiding rules
deployed by a legislative body affirmatively seeking partisan effect. Moreover, the
commission’s rules affirmatively proscribed tribal partisanship intent. See infra text
accompanying notes 268-69. 
261. See, e.g., Barone, supra note 259; Greenhut, supra note 259. These critiques often
focused on the perceived partisan effect of the commission’s work.
262. Professor Bruce Cain, one of the country’s most astute observers of institutional
design and partisan political action in the electoral arena, has recently assessed California’s
commission (and other similar models). See Cain, supra note 134, at 1812-13. He contrasts
this citizens’ commission with “politician commissions” in states like New Jersey: “Whereas
the premise of the independent citizen commission is that improvement will come from a more
disinterested redistricting body utilizing neutral formal redistricting criteria, the premise of
the politician commission is that redistricting is a political enterprise that ideally leads to a
bargained compromise between stakeholders.” Id. at 1817; see also id. at 1823-24.
The central element of the distinction he draws is unquestionably valid. Commissions like
California’s are intended to put “more disinterested” individuals at the helm, and commissions
like New Jersey’s are intended to produce “bargained compromise” among political elites. Id.
at 1817. But elements of his juxtaposition also bear shades of the critique of the nonpartisan
unicorn. More precisely, the juxtaposition adds layers to the premise of each model that are
not necessarily inherent in the genre.
California’s commission was put in place by popular initiative, and was certainly sold as
delivering districts that would be “fair,” and less tailored to particular incumbents. See SEC’Y
OF STATE OF CAL., supra note 260, at 72-73. But the search for “fair” representation is
different from the naïvete implied by Cain’s juxtaposition: proponents did not promise that
criteria would (or could) be “neutral,” or deny that redistricting is a political enterprise. And
in a way, California’s commission also reflects the politician commission idea of bargained
compromise among stakeholders—it just adopts a more expansive conception of the pool of
stakeholders by looking beyond political party leadership.
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their partisan affiliation. And it did not actually end up eliminating
all partisan effects or influences. What it did do, notably, is deploy
multiple tools designed to constrain specific forms of partisanship.
The commission was bound by effect-based rules: substantive
criteria that were not intended to eliminate partisan effects but
that, when followed, would constrain the most partisan outcomes.263
The commission was also created with a supermajority structure:
approval for final maps depended on consent by Democrats,
Republicans, and those not registered with either party.264 These
constraints could be expected to rein in some versions of tribal and
responsive partisanship. Indeed, even policy choices reflecting
strong ideological partisanship, including choices undertaken by
commissioners unaware that the available options reflected a
partisan divide, could be expected to be defeated by a supermajority
structure featuring contending ideological commitments.
Yet these two features alone would not have defeated those intent
on pure tribal partisan gain. The substantive criteria left room for
flexibility, and even if commissioners had not been able to impose
their partisan preferences on each other, Republican commissioners
263. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d). Despite the absence of a criterion explicitly encouraging
competition, conventional wisdom seems to hold that the commission was intended to create
competitive districts. See Cain, supra note 134, at 1824; Tony Quinn, Editorial, Can Arnold
Make You Care About Redistricting?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at 2, available at 2006 WLNR
21900006. But at least some observers recognized that “Prop. 11 ... doesn’t require competitive
districts”—and even used that fact in opposing the initiative. See Prop 11: The Arizona
Mirage, NO ON PROP 11, http://digital.library.ucla.edu/websites/2008_993_117/www.noonprop
11.org/updates.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
Those who believe in the conventional wisdom have conflated the desire to seek competitive
outcomes and the desire to deter the most anticompetitive outcomes. These desires are
meaningfully distinct. And the commission was better designed for the latter than for the
former. See Terry Christensen & Janet Flammang, Proposition 11 Will Bring Fairness, Equity
to Redistricting, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 20, 2008, available at http://www.mercury
news.com/ci_10518420 (“We don’t want to exaggerate the prospects for competitive races,
however. Whoever draws the lines, most districts will have substantial partisan majorities,
since in California, Democrats tend to live among other Democrats and Republicans live
among other Republicans.... This modest reform will not transform our political system or
solve the problems of gridlock, but it will be a step in the right direction.”). As with partisan
bias, see supra text accompanying note 109, it is not inconsistent to resist extremes of
undesired partisan effects without specifying or seeking a particular optimal outcome; George
Skelton, Prop. 11 Foes Waging Orwellian Campaign, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, available at
2005 WLNR 19178210 (“Opponents even have the chutzpa to complain that Prop. 11 ‘doesn’t
require competitive districts.’ No, but unlike the Legislature, its goal would not be to make
districts noncompetitive.”);.
264. CAL. CONST. art XXI, § 2(c)(5).
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had the raw voting power to deny a supermajority, forcing the
drawing of a map to a California Supreme Court265 comprised
overwhelmingly of Justices appointed by Republican governors.266
Absent any other constraints and individuals inclined to pursue
tribal partisanship, game theory would predict final maps drawn by
that Court and favoring Republican interests to the maximum
extent allowed by the flexible substantive criteria.267
Other constraints, however, were not absent—and effect-based
rules and structure were not left to operate alone. Role morality
dictates that the Justices of the California Supreme Court refrain
from tribal partisanship in their judicial capacity.268 Commissioners
were expected to do the same; they were chosen in part based on
their ability to remain “impartial,”269 but even more specifically were
instructed to refrain from drawing districts “for the purpose of
favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candi-
date, or political party.”270 Commissioners were screened to prevent
service by individuals beholden to incumbent legislators; part of the
reason for this screening appears to be the supposition that
independent individuals would more readily adopt the specified
norms against tribal partisanship. And because the commissioners
do indeed seem to have internalized these norms, a supermajority
of the commission did pass final maps, validated in court. Though
the resulting districts had undeniable partisan effects—as does
virtually any electoral choice—there is little evidence to indicate
that tribal partisanship was the cause.
Thus, in this example, flexible substantive rules constrain the
expected degree of partisan effect. A balanced structure and super-
majority rules constrain coincidental and ideological partisanship.
Role norms constrain responsive and tribal partisanship. The three
approaches work together and are designed to work together. And,
perhaps most important for purposes of this Article, articulating the
265. Id. § 2(j). Time permitting, federal courts must generally defer to state institutions in
the redistricting process. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33-37 (1993).
266. Justices, CAL. COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/3014.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2014);
State of California Governors, US50, http://www.theUS50.com/california/governors.php (last
visited Mar. 9, 2014).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34 and note 134.
268. CAL. CODE JUD. ETHICS, Canons 2(B)(1), 3(B)(2), 5, 5(D) (2013).
269. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(d); see also CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(6).
270. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(e).
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distinctions among the forms of partisanship and the capacity of
different policy responses to address those distinctions makes it
possible to articulate how the approaches work together and where
they might break down. This understanding, in turn, should
facilitate the confrontation of partisanship in the regulation of
electoral policy well beyond California’s borders.
